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THE DISTRIBUTIVE DEFICIT IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
 
Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams 
 
Welfarist law and economics ignores the distributive consequences of legal 
rules to focus solely on efficiency, even though distribution unambiguously 
affects welfare, the normative maximand. The now-conventional justification 
for disregarding distribution is the claim of tax superiority:  that the best 
means of influencing or correcting distribution is via tax-and-transfer. 
Critics have observed that optimal redistribution through tax may be 
politically infeasible, but have generally overlooked the rejoinder that the 
same political impediments to redistribution through tax will block 
redistribution through legal rules. This “invariance hypothesis,” as we label 
it, holds that there is only one distributive equilibrium and that Congress 
will offset through tax any deviations from it. We highlight the centrality of 
invariance to the conventional economic wisdom and assert that it is just as 
relevantly false as the zero transaction cost assumption. In contexts where 
political impediments to tax-based redistribution exceed the impediments to 
doctrinal redistribution, it may be possible to increase welfare by 
redistributing outside of tax. Welfarists should, therefore, devote as much 
scholarly attention to the “political action costs” of redistribution as they 
do to transaction costs. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Getting resources or entitlements into the right hands—those in which 
their highest value can be realized—can be costly.1 The economic analysis 
of law is founded on this fact. Were it otherwise, there would be no need to 
concern ourselves with the efficiency of legal rules and institutions because 
costless transactions would set everything right in the blink of an eye.2  Yet 
law and economics has neglected a feature of reality that is no less 
foundational than that of positive transaction costs: the large and variable 
costs associated with the political impediments that must be surmounted to 
achieve welfare-maximizing distributive results.3 We argue that these 
                                                 
1 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
2 See id. at 8; see also R.H. Coase, The Firm, The Market, and the Law 14-15 (1988).  If transaction costs 
were zero, legal rules could be selected based exclusively on distributive concerns—a point Stewart Schwab has 
dubbed “the distributive corollary of the Coase Theorem.” Stewart Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers 
Listen and Economists Do Not, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1171, 1195 (1989). Similar observations appear in Michael J. 
Meurer, Fair Division, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 937, 943 (1999); James E. Krier and Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules 
and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 NYU L. Rev., 440, 448 (1995); Zachary Liscow, 
Reducing Inequality on the Cheap, 123 Yale L.J.  2478, 2500-01 (2014).  
3 We use the shorthand “welfare-maximizing” to refer to maximization based on whatever social welfare 
function has been specified, which might mean maximizing the sum or product of all individual utilities, the 
utilities of the least well-off, or something different.  
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political action costs4 are significant, that they vary in knowable ways 
among types and methods of redistribution, and that perceptions of fairness, 
among other things, play a role in their magnitude.5 Because both efficiency 
and distribution matter to welfare, the two impediments to its 
maximization—transaction costs and political action costs—should be 
treated in parallel fashion.6 If this were done, the now-conventional 
assumption that tax-and-transfer will always trump other redistributive 
methods could not stand. Nor could the economic analysis of law ignore 
distributive deficits7—and the political costs of addressing them—when 
evaluating legal rules.8   
 
To begin, compare the following paragraphs:  
 
1. A court must decide whether to allow a factory to pollute to 
the detriment of nearby neighbors. If it is evident that the factory 
would gain more wealth from polluting than the neighbors would 
lose (and no one else is affected by the decision), the court should 
assign the pollution entitlement to the factory. This is the efficient 
result. Assigning the entitlement to the neighbors would require a 
transaction between the neighbors and the factory to achieve the 
same allocative result, which would be (at best) costly, and possibly 
prohibitively so. If the distributive effect of assigning the 
entitlement to the factory rather than to the neighbors is unwanted 
(because it fails to maximize welfare), this can be readily corrected 
through a tax-and-transfer system.  
 
2. A court must decide whether to allow a factory to pollute to 
the detriment of nearby neighbors. If it is evident that the neighbors 
would glean more welfare from the wealth represented by the 
                                                 
4 See text accompanying notes 82-83, infra (providing a taxonomy of these costs). These costs are distinct 
from the technical or administrative challenges involved in adjusting distribution, such as the costs of assessing or 
collecting taxes. For a discussion of administrative costs, see infra note 30.   
5 We are not the first to note the potential implications of political costs for law and economics. See, for 
example, Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion Argument” Articles Are Wrong, 
13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 511, 557, 597–601 (2005); Brett H. McDonnell, The Economists' New Arguments, 88 
Minn. L. Rev. 86, 111 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 303, 
314-15 (2007).  However, the role of political impediments that might apply differentially to different modes of 
redistribution has been widely underappreciated.   
6 See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to 
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1655, 1665-69, 1676-81 (1974) (critiquing Posner’s focus 
on the falsity of the zero transaction cost assumption to the exclusion of other artificial assumptions, including 
costless redistribution). Although Polinsky focuses on the distortive effects of taxes rather than their political 
costs, his critique emphasizes, as we do here, the importance of treating all impediments to welfare maximization 
in like fashion.   
7 A “distributive deficit” represents the degree to which a given distribution fails to maximize welfare for a 
given total quantity of wealth. Neglect of this deficit has led to a scholarly deficit in the economic analysis of law.  
8 Except as otherwise specified, we will use the term “legal rules” in this article to refer to nontax legal rules 
and policies, whether enacted by legislative or administrative bodies or adopted by courts.   
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entitlement than the factory would lose (and no one else is affected 
by the decision), then the entitlement should be assigned to the 
neighbors. This facilitates the welfare-maximizing result. Assigning 
the entitlement to the factory would require a political act to achieve 
the same distributive result, which would be (at best) costly, and 
possibly prohibitively so. If the allocative effect of assigning the 
entitlement to the neighbors rather than the factory would prove 
inefficient, this can be readily corrected through a transaction 
between the factory and the neighbors.  
 
The first paragraph represents a standard law and economics account of 
how entitlements to resources should be assigned.9 The last line is crucial to 
achieving the acknowledged goal of most law and economics scholars: 
welfare maximization. Yet rarely is there any mention of the political acts 
necessary to achieve this desired distributive result; the implication, 
intended or not, is that these costs are too trivial to merit sustained 
attention.10 The second paragraph shows how this same account might look 
if the transactions required to achieve a desired allocative result were 
deemed to be trivial and the political acts required to achieve a desired 
distributive result were understood to be costly.  
The second paragraph will strike readers as outrageously false, and we 
agree that it is. But so too is the first paragraph.11 Both the private 
transactions required to change the allocation of resources and the political 
acts required to change the distribution of wealth are costly, and at times 
prohibitively so. Just as we do not invariably get efficient results regardless 
of the initial assignment of legal entitlements, we do not invariably get 
welfare-maximizing distributive results regardless of the initial distributive 
effects of legal rules. On the contrary, different legal rules can produce 
                                                 
9 Although such formulations are recognized to employ simplifying assumptions, the usual takeaway 
message is that the focus on efficiency is justified. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and 
Economics 10 (4th ed. 2011) ([F]or purposes of discussing the legal system, a reasonable simplifying assumption 
is that income can be costlessly redistributed”); id. at 161-62 (concluding, after building in the costs of 
redistribution, that “legal rules still should be based primarily on efficiency considerations because legal rules 
generally are more costly than taxes and transfers as a means of redistributing income and are less precise.”).  
10 The primary cost associated with redistribution that receives attention from legal economists is the 
labor/leisure distortion.  But because this is thought to be common to all distributive efforts, including those built 
into legal rules, it is not viewed as uniquely attaching to the redistributive effort contemplated in the first 
paragraph. Administrative costs are also understood to exist but are given limited attention on the supposition that 
they will be lower for tax-and-transfer than for doctrinal methods of redistribution. See infra notes __ and 
accompanying text.  
11 It might be argued that the second paragraph is more misguided than the first, since neither wealth nor 
welfare can be maximized unless the (actually costly) transaction to change the allocation occurs. In the first 
paragraph, by contrast, we can be sure that wealth maximization occurs, whether or not welfare maximization ever 
does. But achieving wealth maximization for a given distribution carries no more inherent value than achieving 
the most welfare-advancing distribution for a given level of wealth, given that both efficiency and distribution 
matter to the ultimate goal of welfare. To be sure, we have a word, “efficient,” to describe the first result and have 
no analogous word for the second result.  But this linguistic peculiarity should not be allowed to skew analysis.  
For a welfarist, both paragraphs should be equally problematic.  
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different distributive results—ones that will perform better or worse on a 
given distributive metric.12 Even where we do manage to get the same 
distributive result from different starting points, the cost of achieving that 
outcome will depend on the magnitude of political action costs—just as the 
cost of achieving a preferred allocative result depends on the magnitude of 
transaction costs.  
If we pay as much attention to these political costs as we do to private 
transaction costs, we will end up questioning an important tenet of 
conventional economic wisdom. Suppose a court is confronted with a case 
like the factory dispute above in which distributive and efficiency 
considerations point in opposite directions. Should the court weigh the 
efficiency effect on welfare against the distributional effect on welfare—for 
example, choose a slightly less efficient rule that will avoid generating large 
distributive deficits? Conventional law and economics says no: the judge 
should decide the rule solely on grounds of efficiency and leave distribution 
to the tax-and-transfer system, because doing so will generate fewer 
behavioral distortions.13  
On this view, any distributive deficit associated with the court’s ruling 
can be better addressed through the tax system. For this to always be the 
case, however, it is not enough to show that tax-and-transfer minimizes the 
behavioral distortions associated with redistribution;14 instead, tax-and-
transfer must perform better overall at achieving distributive shifts, after the 
political costs of achieving the desired distributive changes are taken into 
account. It is plausible that the presence of political action costs would 
necessitate second-best methods of governmental redistribution,15 just as 
positive transaction costs will cause private parties to adopt second-best 
contracts when transaction costs block the first-best. “Political failure” no 
less than “market failure,” can thwart efforts at welfare maximization. 
The conventional wisdom at this point responds with a crucial but 
poorly understood claim that we term “the invariance hypothesis”: that any 
political failure that exists for tax-and-transfer must inevitably plague non-
tax methods of distribution to at least the same degree—whether because 
                                                 
12 As our later discussion makes clear, welfare maximization must be evaluated by reference to a given 
social welfare function..   
13 In brief, the labor/leisure distortion is thought to attend all redistributive efforts, while inefficient 
redistributive legal rules additionally distort behavior in the domain to which the rule applies. See infra notes __ 
and accompanying text.  
14 See infra Part I.A. (discussing the principle of tax superiority and the “double distortion” argument).  
15 See, e.g., Liscow, supra note 2, at 2508 (“[I]f transfers are unavailable in practice, their theoretical 
availability is irrelevant; as a result, the legal rule should adopt the second-best policy of taking equity directly 
into account[.]”); see also Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 144-45 
(2006) (suggesting that an administrative agency might at times be able to improve “overall well-being” through 
attention to distributive impacts where tax-and-transfer will not occur, and observing that “if this result is welfare 
inferior to an alternative that is politically impossible, that is irrelevant”). Although any tax system based on 
income is already firmly in the realm of the second-best, the claim of tax superiority assumes a first-best political 
situation, by ignoring the real-world political resistance to the income tax.  
1-Jan-15] DISTRIBUTIVE DEFICIT 5 
the other legal actors are themselves subject to the same political 
constraints, or because their distributive efforts will be offset by the 
legislature. If this were true, political failure would make any shortfalls in 
redistribution inevitable regardless of what distributive methods were 
employed, so we would still do best to leave redistribution to tax-and-
transfer (however inadequately it might accomplish the task). But, as we 
will show, the invariance hypothesis is not true.  
This article makes three claims, corresponding to its three Parts. In Part 
I, we show that law and economic analysis embeds a distributive invariance 
hypothesis that the same distributive result will be achieved regardless of 
how legal rules are configured or how entitlements to resources are 
assigned.16 This invariance hypothesis rests in turn on an unstated 
assumption that political action costs for tax adjustments are equal to or less 
than for any other method of distributing the same quantum of income.  
In Part II, we argue that the invariance hypothesis is false. Political 
action costs for redistribution are not only frequently large, they also vary 
dramatically among contexts for a variety of reasons—including political 
inertia, interest group politics, framing, and real or perceived conformity 
with background notions of fairness. As a result, legal rules may be able to 
achieve and maintain distributive results that tax-and-transfer cannot. By 
the same token, choosing efficient legal rules over less efficient ones may 
introduce unwanted distributive side effects that tax-and-transfer cannot or 
will not correct.  
In Part III, we argue that attending to political costs leads to different 
conclusions about how welfarists should approach the task of designing 
legal rules and institutions than those that are currently dominant in law and 
economics. Welfarists working in law and economics should give the role 
of political action costs in sustaining distributive deficits attention on a par 
with that already given to the role of transaction costs in impeding efficient 
results. There should be broad recognition within law and economics of the 
falsity of the invariance hypothesis and the associated possibility that legal 
rules can have durable, welfare-relevant distributive consequences. Legal 
rules are thus not axiomatically inferior to tax-and-transfer as a means of 
achieving or maintaining desired distributive results—though they may be 
so in many domains as an empirical matter.     
Our project’s significance goes beyond adding to the debate over the 
best way to redistribute, however. It also focuses attention on the 
phenomenon of distributive variance, or multiple distributive equilibria, 
within a political system. Not only does this phenomenon warrant study as a 
                                                 
16 This hypothesis sometimes appears in the literature as a modeling assumption that is understood to 
possibly or definitely depart from reality; at other times, it is cast as an empirical claim about the way distributive 
results are actually accomplished. See infra Part I.C. 
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positive matter, it also raises interesting normative questions for welfarists. 
For example, we might wonder if there are independent welfarist reasons 
for preferring the distributive equilibrium reached through one institutional 
channel rather than another (such as legislatures rather than courts), apart 
from the distributional content of the alternatives and the behavioral 
distortions they produce.17 A desire to glean the benefits of a less 
distortionary (or otherwise preferred) redistributive method should also spur 
interest in mechanisms for addressing distributive variance—such as rules 
or policies that would make doctrinal choices with distributive implications 
conditional on corresponding tax adjustments.18   
 
I. INTRODUCING THE INVARIANCE HYPOTHESIS 
 
A hypothesis of distributive invariance—that the same distributive 
result will be achieved regardless of how legal entitlements are assigned—
underpins much of what has become the standard law and economics 
approach. It comprises the following cluster of subclaims: 
 
1. Any distributive result that can be achieved at all can be 
achieved (at lower cost) through tax-and-transfer. 
 
2. The current distribution of political power creates a single 
equilibrium level of distribution. If any governmental actor or 
agency produces some other distributive result, whether through 
intentional distributive efforts or as a side effect of pursuing other 
goals, the divergence from the equilibrium distributive pattern will 
be counteracted through the tax-and-transfer system.  
 
3. Whatever distributive pattern we observe at a given time 
either instantiates society’s social welfare function or approximates 
it as closely as the current political equilibrium will allow. Excising 
distributive considerations from all non-tax law will allow this 
distributive pattern to be maintained at minimum cost while 
introducing distributive considerations into non-tax law will raise 
the cost of maintaining the distribution, but the distribution itself can 
never be improved upon.  
 
Such claims fail to account for the costs of political action necessary to 
produce and maintain society’s desired distributive patterns. They rest on an 
                                                 
17 See infra Part III.B.3. 
18 See infra Part III.C.3.  For example, a shift to congestion pricing of roads might be made conditional on 
the tax system increasing its progressivity to preserve distributive neutrality.   
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unstated assumption that the political action costs for redistributing through 
tax-and-transfer are never greater than for any other method of distribution 
(including distributive choices that are bundled into judicial and 
administrative decisions and that require no independent redistributive 
step). If this assumption is untrue, the invariance hypothesis unravels. If 
political action entails prohibitive costs from one allocative starting point 
but becomes affordable or even unnecessary from another, or if 
redistributing through one means rather than another can reduce the 
associated political action costs, then distributive results will depend on 
how law and institutions are structured. We will take up our case against the 
invariance hypothesis in Part II. First, however, it is helpful to lay out in 
more detail the arguments and prescriptions that are implicitly premised on 
it. This establishes what is at stake.  
For convenience, we will refer mainly to the work of Louis Kaplow and 
Steven Shavell (K&S) in the balance of this Part.19 However, because their 
position has become mainstream among law and economics scholars, we 
take ourselves to be critiquing the approach as a whole and not just these 
scholars in particular. As we hope will become clear, not only does our 
argument in some respects go beyond merely critiquing K&S, but some of 
what we say would likely produce agreement from K&S themselves. First, 
we discuss the claim that tax-and-transfer is categorically preferable to legal 
rules for achieving distributive results (“the principle of tax superiority”). 
Second, we show how this approach assumes the invariance hypothesis.   
 
A.  The Principle of Tax Superiority 
 
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (K&S) famously argue that tax20 is 
strictly superior to legal doctrine as a means of redistributing income.21  
They were not the first to make this claim, but they very cogently developed 
and defended the idea in a series of articles now well known within law and 
                                                 
19 Kaplow and Shavell develop the principle of tax superiority in both joint and solo work.  The primary 
articles in this vein are Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: 
Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am Econ Rev 414 (1981); Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income, 23 J Legal Stud 667 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient]; Louis Kaplow, The Optimal 
Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 Natl Tax J 513 (1996). For the related public 
finance literature on commodity taxation, see Anthony B. Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax 
Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J Pub Econ 55 (1976); Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of 
Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J Pub Econ 217 (2002). 
20 We use the term “tax” in this essay interchangeably with “tax-and-transfer” to encompass transfer 
payments.   
21 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19. K&S do qualify this claim in some respects. See Kaplow & 
Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Stud. 821, 825-34 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules]. For the 
most part, these qualifications are highly technical and not relevant to the discussion here. K&S’s treatment of the 
issue at the heart of our analysis—the possibility that distribution may be changed by other legal actors in a way 
that Congress does not offset—is detailed extensively below.  See infra Part I.C.       
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economics. Their conclusion that welfarists should ignore distributive 
consequences in most legal contexts, notwithstanding the importance of 
distribution to welfare, is a strikingly counterintuitive and provocative one.   
It is a surprise to some non-economic theorists, but welfare economics 
places great significance on distribution.22 Distribution matters to welfare 
maximization in potentially two ways. First, distribution of wealth or other 
resources can affect individual welfare for a variety of reasons. The most 
general point is the declining marginal utility of money, which means that 
moving a dollar from the rich to the poor will typically increase the welfare 
of the poor more than it diminishes the welfare of the rich.23 Second, social 
welfare functions may aggregate individual welfare in a manner that makes 
the distribution of utility or well-being itself relevant. One may plausibly 
choose a non-utilitarian social welfare function that gives some weight to 
the greater equality of welfare.24 K&S dispute neither point. Their argument 
is one of means rather than ends: given the end of increasing (or decreasing) 
income equality, the best means is tax. 
When K&S first jointly proposed the distributional superiority of tax in 
1994, they could plausibly state that they were writing against the 
conventional wisdom of lawyers and law professors: that legal doctrine 
offered a superior means of redistributing because it avoided the distortion 
of labor-leisure decisions.25 K&S argued that this line of reasoning was 
erroneous: if doctrinal rules operate like a tax by redistributing wealth from 
the rich to the poor, people will notice themselves earning a lower return on 
their labor as their income rises, and the same labor-leisure distortion will 
occur.26 If both tax and legal doctrine distort the labor-leisure decision to 
                                                 
22 [distinguish welfare maximization from wealth maximization].   
23 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare 30 (2002). There are numerous other 
channels through which distribution might influence utility, although the evidence is often mixed on these effects. 
See, e,g., Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 Univ. of Chicago Legal Forum, 23 (2010) 
(discussing contested empirical and theoretical literature finding that inequality increases crime and constrains 
economic growth); Emily Underwood, Can disparities be deadly? Controversial research explores whether living 
in an unequal society can make people sick, 344 Science 829 (May 2014) (examining contested evidence  that 
widespread inequality causes a variety of negative health effects);  Juan Jose Ganuza and Fernando Gomez, 
Optimal Negligence Rule Under Limited Liability, UPF Working Paper No. 759 (2004), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=563849 (observing that inequality may result in more people 
being judgment-proof for many possible torts and therefore not subject to deterrence by a first-best liability rule); 
Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The Welfare Conundrum, 1994 Wisc. L. 
Rev. 235 (1994) (discussing literature on a variety of potential costs of poverty and inequality including the 
inadequate development of human capital, aesthetic distress from observing people in poverty, crime and rioting, 
fear of experiencing poverty in the future, and other costs arising from interdependent utility functions or 
preferences for certain distributive patterns). See generally Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: 
Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger (2011).  
24 A utilitarian social welfare function seeks to maximize the sum of individual welfare levels, but plausible 
alternatives involve more complex functions, such as maximizing the sum of the square roots of individual 
welfare levels, which would have the effect of valuing equality of welfare.  
25 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1075, 1084-85 (1980) (suggesting that a remedial choice might be a less expensive way to redistribute, and 
observing that “[d]ue to the substantial distortions in work effort, redistribution through the tax system would be 
quite costly in terms of efficiency”). 
26 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 19, at 667-68. This equivalence has been disputed. 
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the same degree, tax then has the advantage of avoiding the additional 
distortion created by any deviation from efficient legal rules.27 Although 
this extra distortion argument has been assailed from various directions,28 
we accept it as accurate for purposes of our discussion here; our arguments 
apply whether it is true or false. 
K&S move from the extra distortion argument to a simple policy 
recommendation: even though distribution matters to social welfare, legal 
doctrine should focus exclusively on efficiency.29 In doing so, they 
implicitly assume that there are no other costs in the picture that might vary 
in a way that would favor a nontax method of distribution.30 The principle 
of tax superiority has been the subject of numerous critiques and ongoing 
debate.31 Nonetheless, our sense today is that the K&S position has become 
the conventional wisdom, at least among many law professors who employ 
                                                                                                                            
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1653 
(1998) (arguing that legal rules may be less distortive due to cognitive biases);  see also Chris William Sanchirico, 
Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. Legal Stud., 797, 800 (2000) 
(arguing that the extra distortion argument does not apply to “income-independent, equity-motivated deviations 
from efficient legal standards”); Liscow, supra note 2 (arguing that distortions to labor/leisure can be avoided or 
mitigated by applying rules that distribute entitlements based on group membership that correlates with income 
levels rather than on individual income levels).   
27 This argument is undermined to the extent that real-world tax and transfer systems embed design choices 
that can add distortions beyond labor-leisure, including choices about family composition and residential location. 
These potential distortions have, of course, been staples of discussions about transfers to low-income people for 
decades. For a recent discussion, see Scott Sumner, Guaranteed Annual Income: Let’s Talk Numbers, 
TheMoneyIllusion blog, Sept. 27, 2014, www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=27639. As K&S recognize, the matter is 
also more complex than simply counting the number of distortions, because one distortion might offset rather than 
add to another distortion. Thus, for example, a behavioral distortion that led someone to consume less of a good 
that is strongly complementary to leisure might offset rather than add to the labor/leisure distortion. See Kaplow 
& Shavell, Legal Rules, supra note 21, at 825-26.   
28 See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 26; Sanchirico, supra note 26, Liscow, supra note 2; Markovits, supra note 5. 
29 See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 19, at 677.  
30Administrative costs receive some attention from K&S. See id. at 675 n.12  (“[A]lthough we did not 
consider the possible additional administrative costs of increasing the amount of redistribution through the income 
tax, it seems plausible that these costs would be less than those of achieving significant, well-targeted 
redistribution through legal rules.”); Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, supra note 21, at  834 n. 30 (“Nor do we 
address administrative costs, which would seem to be an important factor that weighs against using legal rules to 
attempt to redistribute significant amounts of income.”) (emphasis in original). See also Markovits at 608-10 
(discussing and critiquing K&S’s neglect of this topic). A somewhat longer discussion of administrative costs 
appears in Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 656-67 (2004) (acknowledging that 
administrative costs of tax system are nontrivial and suggesting that the costs of legal rules blend together high 
administrative cost elements such as litigation with low administrative cost elements like influencing behavior via 
deterrence). Because our primary focus in this article is on political action costs, we do not focus on 
administrative costs but note only that they represent another reason for doubt about the unqualified claim of tax 
superiority. See Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On the Limits of Redistributive Taxation: Establishing a 
Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 11-14 (2005) (arguing that administrative costs might 
favor redistributing through non-tax rules).; see generally Walter Perrin Heller and Karl Shell, On Optimal 
Taxation with Costly Administration, 64 Amer. Econ. Rev., Papers and Proceedings 338 (May, 1974). 
31 E.g., Sanchirico, supra note 26; Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 
86 Cornell L. Rev. 1003 (2001); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution through Private Law, 91 
Minn. L. Rev.326 (2006); Markovits, supra note 5; Liscow, supra note 2; Ronen Avraham, et al., Revisiting the 
Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 
1125 (2004); Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 30;  Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos Exploring the Shavellian 
Boundary: Violations from Judgment-Proofing, Minority Rights, and Signaling, 3 J.L. Econ. & Policy 47-62 
(2006); Noah Popp, Wealth vs. Welfare: Correcting for the Marginal Utility of Wealth in Assigning Private Law 
Entitlements, 30 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 69 (2011).  
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economic analysis.32  
It is useful to briefly consider how K&S’s primary argument for tax 
superiority fits into other arguments against using non-tax legal doctrine to 
redistribute income. First, legal rules may actually fail to affect distribution 
in the desired direction due to private-party adjustments along other 
dimensions. For example, a living wage or rent control law may not help the 
poor, if employers or landlords can adjust other terms of the employment or 
landlord-tenant bargain.33 This is the futility or “contracting around” 
objection.34 Second, redistributive legal rules not precisely tied to income 
can only roughly redistribute in the desired direction – say, from rich to 
poor – while sometimes pushing money in the wrong direction. This 
problem of “leakage” is one facet of what is sometimes termed “the 
haphazardness objection” to redistributive legal rules.35 Another facet of 
that objection goes to the underinclusiveness of attempting to redistribute 
through rules that will only directly impact a small subset of people in a 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 30, at 2 (noting that the K&S stance on tax superiority 
“seems to be the prevailing norm in the law and economics literature”); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, 
Redistributing Optimally, 56 Tax L. Rev. 157, 158 (2003) (“[W[e believe it is a safe bet that a majority of legal 
economists hold the following view: Whatever amount of redistribution is deemed appropriate or desirable, the 
exclusive policy tool for redistributing to reduce income or wealth inequality should always be the tax-and-
transfer system.”); Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 112 (3d ed. 2000) (presenting 
administrative and extra-distortion arguments for preferring progressive income taxation over redistributive 
assignment of property rights and concluding that “economists who favor redistribution and economists who 
oppose it can agree that property law is usually the wrong way to pursue distributive justice”); Robert C. 
Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners, John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and 
Public Policy Research Paper No. 499 at 24-25 (2014) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2464545 (“[M]ost 
law-and-economics scholars . . . conclude that distributive goals are better pursued by means of broad tax and 
welfare programs than by the introduction of distributive considerations into the rules for resolving ordinary 
private law disputes.”) (footnotes omitted); Liscow, supra note 2, at 2480 (“Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis 
supports what is perhaps the central tenet of law and economics, namely that legal rules should be designed based 
on their efficiency consequences”); Avraham, et al. , supra note 31, at 1126 (describing “a view [among 
economists] that has become the new conventional wisdom: that income (or wealth) redistribution is always better 
accomplished through the tax-and-transfer system than through the legal system.”); It is not only those within law 
and economics but also those standing outside of it who view the K&S prescription as central to law and 
economics. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 465, 468 (ed. Peter Newman 1998) (presenting tenets of 
the “mainstream” law and economics approach, which include having courts pursue efficiency and leaving 
distribution to the legislature through tax-and-transfer).  
33 See, e.g., Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc v City of Chicago, 819 F2d 732, 741 (7th Cir 1987) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (“Landlords will try to offset the higher cost [associated with Chicago’s landlord-tenant ordinance] by 
raising rents.”). A related point is that poor people may be harmed by behavioral distortions produced by such 
legal rules, if, for example, fewer jobs or apartments are made available by employers or landlords—although the 
empirical evidence on such issues is often unclear. See, e.g., Liscow, supra note 2, at 2498 n.46 (noting mixed 
empirical and theoretical findings on the extent to which the minimum wage reduces employment or manages to 
redistribute).  
34 See, e.g., David Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income, 70 U Chi L Rev 439, 
448-49 (2003); see also Liscow, supra note 2, at 2497-2500 (discussing the economic incidence of redistributive 
efforts and noting that even pure transfer programs like the EITC have an incidence-shifting effect by pushing 
more workers into the work force and depressing wages); Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River 
Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (“The idea that favoring one side or the other 
in a class of contract disputes can redistribute wealth is one of the most persistent illusions of judicial power.”). 
35 See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 34, at 449 (2003) (referring to problems of both underinclusion and 
overinclusion as “the haphazardness problem”). [Cf. Weisbach 2014 re: subset of markets subject to agency 
regulation]. 
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given income bracket—those who happen, for example, to suffer injury at 
the hands of a tortfeasor. 
These arguments depend on deeply contextual inquiries. Not all 
doctrinal efforts to redistribute are futile.36 Arguments premised on 
underinclusiveness may fail to take into account the way that legal rules 
shape conduct and expectations outside the courtroom.37 And 
overinclusiveness is neither unique to doctrinal redistribution38 nor always 
without its countervailing virtues.39  As a result, neither contracting around 
nor haphazardness provides a universal argument for tax superiority. This is 
where K&S’s extra-distortion argument comes in to (ostensibly) deal the 
knock-out punch, providing an across-the-board reason to disfavor 
redistributive legal rules.40   
Based on this argument, K&S have straightforward advice for the 
decision-maker in the present example: never pick a less efficient Rule A 
over a more efficient Rule B for the reason that it will – in fact – desirably 
distribute income and enhance social welfare; the apparent distributive 
virtue of Rule A is illusory because there is always a better way to get the 
same level of redistribution via tax.41 The idea that distributive changes are 
always best pursued through the tax system supports a strict division of 
labor in which those charged with formulating legal rules use efficiency as 
                                                 
36 See e.g., Weisbach, supra note 34, at 449 (noting theoretical and empirical difficulty of determining 
effects of legal rules and concluding “that some probably help their intended beneficiaries and some probably do 
not”). If redistribution through legal rules were always illusory, there would be no need to consider K&S’s extra-
distortion argument, nor our discussion in this paper of political action costs. Redistributive legal rules, like 
unicorns, would be wholly imaginary phenomena.  But no one, including K&S, thinks it is literally impossible for 
any redistribution to occur through legal rules or doctrines outside of tax law. 
37 Legal rules may operate to the benefit or detriment of income classes through deterrence effects, even if 
relatively few members of those income classes wind up in court. See Logue & Avraham, supra note 32, at 185-
86. For example, making tort recovery sensitive to actual lost income might be expected to yield less careful 
driving in low-income neighborhoods or less careful treatment of low-income patients, whereas averaging income 
would tend to equalize the deterrence effects across income classes. See Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 
121 Yale L.J. 82, 97-99 (2011).  See also Logue & Avraham, supra note 32, at 186-88 (discussing additional 
arguments against underinclusiveness, including the potential for insurance markets to translate expected impacts 
into premium differences); Sanchirico, supra note 31, at 1052 (contending that private law as a whole is a 
comprehensive system, even if particular rules within it are not, and noting that insurance spreads the impact of 
legal rules that are triggered by specific events). 
38 In fact, tax law itself (as it exists on the ground) is riddled with exceptions and examples of poor targeting.  
See Weisbach, supra note 34, at 452 (observing that the tax system is “riven with loopholes” but suggesting legal 
rules would be no better and “could easily be much worse”). There are also important debates about whether 
income offers a sufficiently good measurement of well-being to serve as the basis for targeting in the first place. 
See Sanchirico, supra note 26; see also Liscow, supra note 2 at 2502-09 (suggesting that some redistributive 
efforts may be better targeted based on some non-income measure of desert or need, rather than income). 
39 See, e.g., notes 96-98, infra and accompanying text (noting potential political advantages of imperfect 
targeting or “leakage”). 
40 See Avraham, et al., supra note 31, at 1127 (noting that K&S “made what seemed to be a decisive 
argument regarding the use of redistributive legal rules. They argued that income redistribution is always more 
efficiently accomplished through the tax-and-transfer system, even if the contracting-around and haphazardness 
issues are placed aside.”). 
41 K&S do not directly address legal decisionmakers in their work, but they do state that their extra distortion 
argument, when added to the other arguments that support redistribution through tax-and-transfer, “suggests that it 
is appropriate for economic analysis of legal rules to focus on efficiency and to ignore the distribution of income 
in offering normative judgments.” K&S, supra note 21, at 677 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).    
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their maximand.42 This is, at any rate, the conventional understanding of 
K&S’s proof.43 
This prescription carries obvious implications for the work of courts. To 
illustrate, consider the following examples:44   
 
Arbitration Clause. A court is deciding whether to 
enforce or invalidate an arbitration clause in a standardized 
consumer contract. Perhaps enforcing the clause redistributes 
away from the rich consumers (who value more highly the 
right to sue in court) and toward low and middle income 
consumers (who value a cheaper product and a cheaper 
process).45 Or perhaps the opposite is true, because 
invalidating the arbitration clause preserves the right to bring 
class action suits, and this would benefit lower income 
people.46   
 
Tort Recovery. A court is deciding whether to award 
damages for lost income based on the particular plaintiff’s 
actual expected income (the tailored rule) or based on the 
average expected income of people in the same age cohort 
living in the community (the untailored rule). The former 
would favor higher income people over lower income 
people, while the latter would have the opposite effect.47 
 
In cases such as these, the principle of tax superiority suggests the court 
should focus only on the efficiency implications of these decisions and 
                                                 
42 This division of labor tracks the First and Second Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics, as well 
as the more prosaic admonition to separate pie maximization from pie slicing. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery A 
New Understanding of Tax, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 807, 817 fn. 21 (2005) (referencing ‘the argument of Louis 
Kaplow and Steven Shavell, tracking the two welfare theorems, that the general legal system should be evaluated 
vis-à-vis the goal of welfare maximization or allocative efficiency, leaving the tax system to redistribute wealth.’); 
Meurer, supra note 2, at 941 fn. 28 (1999) (explaining how law and economics “bifurcates efficiency and fairness 
analysis of the law” and describing the  “usual attitude . . . that law should be shaped by efficiency concerns, and 
[that] the legislature can achieve fairness through taxing and spending policies.’); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky, 
An Introduction to Law and Economics 7 (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, 4th ed. 2011) 
(‘efficiency corresponds to “the size of the pie,” while equity has to do with how it is sliced’). 
43 We say this with some confidence, having reviewed scores of citations to K&S on this point appearing in 
articles published from 2005 through 2013.   
44 The examples provided here and elsewhere in the article are offered for purposes of concreteness, not to 
defend strong claims about the distributive or efficiency consequences at play in any of these particular scenarios.    
45 See Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Courts: Economic Analysis, in Regulatory Competition 
in Contract Law and Dispute Resolution 447, 458-62 (Horst Eidenmiller, ed., 2013).  
46 The analysis here is complex. See id. at 462-65. While recoveries are low for class action plaintiffs, the 
deterrence effect might on some assumptions benefit consumers sufficiently to make up for the more expensive 
product.  
47 See, e.g., Keren-Paz at 51-52. 67-69 (noting distributive effects of restitutio ad integrum, which provides 
for tailored compensation). Similarly, administrative agencies must decide whether, in cost-benefit analysis, to use 
a single measure of the value of a statistical life (VSL) or whether to adjust the value depending on the expected 
income of the lives saved. [cite] 
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ignore the distributive consequences. Where efficiency cuts in a different 
direction than distributive desirability (on a given social welfare function), 
this amounts to advice to choose a distributively inferior result.  
Although K&S emphasize court-made law, the implication of the theory 
is by no means limited to courts. As a logical matter, their policy 
prescription applies just as strongly to the legislature, which should 
redistribute income though its tax mechanisms and not through any other 
type of law.48  For example:  
 
Teacher Tenure. A state legislature must decide whether 
to keep or discard a teacher tenure provision. Suppose the 
provision has the effect of increasing the number of school 
teachers at the high end of the ability distribution (because 
they value academic freedom) and at the low end of the 
ability distribution (because they value the ability to shirk 
without losing their jobs). If we assume that the teachers at 
the high end of the distribution primary serve high income 
schools and those at the low end of the distribution primarily 
serve low income schools, retaining the provision will 
distribute toward the wealthy, while discarding it will 
distribute toward the poor.49 
 
Military Recruitment. Congress must decide whether to 
staff the military with volunteers or conscript by lottery. 
Because volunteer forces are disproportionately drawn from 
the poor, this system of government employment tends to 
transfer income to the poor in times of peace and away from 
the poor in times of war.  
 
Once again, K&S would urge that these non-tax legislative decisions be 
made based on their efficiency implications and not based on their 
distributive consequences.  
The same advice applies to the decisions of executives and 
administrative agencies.  Consider the following:  
 
 Criminal Enforcement. The mayor of a city orders the 
                                                 
48 Indeed, the K&S analysis would specify use of only certain kinds of broad based taxes on income or 
wages, not merely any policy instrument that happens to appear in the Internal Revenue Code. Using “tax 
expenditures” like the mortgage interest deduction, for example, introduces distortions into housing consumption 
choices without alleviating labor/leisure distortions—assuming the same revenues are collected by increasing 
burdens elsewhere.  
49 Cf. Vergara v. California, California Superior Court, June 2014 (slip op. at 15) (striking down teacher 
tenure statutes as violative of state constitution and noting that they “disproportionately affect poor and/or 
minority students”).  
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police chief to move undercover drug operations from poor 
to wealthy neighborhoods and target the types of drugs that 
are more prevalent in those neighborhoods. The district 
attorney shifts from a priority of pursuing prostitutes to a 
priority of pursuing their customers. Both measures strongly 
affect the distribution of the costs and benefits of criminal 
enforcement.50  
 
Environmental Regulations. Proposed administrative 
regulations aimed at protecting the environment raise the 
price of electricity in a manner that disproportionately 
burdens poor households. Other proposed regulations raise 
property values near polluting facilities in a manner that, on 
average, benefits poor neighborhoods.51  
 
In all such cases, if the law is not tax, the advice in selecting a rule is to 
give no weight to distribution.52  
 
B.  Tax Superiority’s Foundation in Distributive Invariance 
 
The principle of tax superiority rests on a hypothesis of distributive 
invariance that occupies a crucial but underappreciated position within the 
K&S analysis.53 Specifically, K&S assume that the distributive pattern in a 
society will be invariant to the political form of redistribution.54 If the courts 
uphold arbitration clauses and grant entitlements against pollution to the 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1171 (2013). 
51 Whether property value increases near factories would help poor people in the area depends on whether 
they own their homes or rent. See Adler & Posner, supra note 15, at 143-44 (considering the possible distributive 
effects of an agency decision about whether to site a park in a wealthy or poor neighborhood). 
52 Some law and economics scholars working in administrative law have been open to considering 
distributive considerations in addressing how (or if) cost benefit analysis should be conducted. See, e.g., Adler & 
Posner, supra note 15, at 130-31, 142-46, 188. The distributive issue is presented bluntly in the cost-benefit 
context because the diminishing marginal utility of money makes the willingness to pay of the rich much greater 
than that of the poor. Equalizing welfare would require accounting for wealth differences. Although a tax-and-
transfer system might be better in theory, its practical unavailability changes the calculus. See id. at 144-45. For a 
critique of this justification for using distributive weights in regulatory policy, see David A. Weisbach, 
Distributionally-Weighted Cost Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets Organizational Design, (Draft of 
July 7, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2450142. 
53 K&S acknowledge this assumption to some degree, and provide qualifications based on it, as we explain 
below. See infra Part I.C. However, our review of the literature indicates that the significance of the assumption 
and qualifications it implies for the principle of tax superiority have not been widely appreciated.   
54 In other words, there will be the same total amount of redistribution from a baseline in which all legal 
rules are wealth-maximizing. Using legal entitlements to influence distributive patterns can obviously reduce the 
amount of explicit redistribution that occurs, even if invariance is assumed. It is a semantic question (but not a 
politically unfreighted one) whether distributive choices that are “baked into” legal rules, institutional structures, 
and entitlement allocation choices should be regarded as “redistributive” (as opposed to just distributive) 
whenever they depart from those choices that would maximize wealth. For discussion of the relevance of 
baselines to the definition of redistribution, see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Redistribution, available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/redistribution/; see also Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of 
Ownership: Taxes and Justice (2002). 
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poor and Congress replaces conscription with an all-volunteer force during 
peacetime, the resulting distributive changes will be offset by tax 
adjustments to the extent they produce divergence from the distributive 
pattern corresponding to the current political equilibrium. Conversely, if 
legal rules and policies are adopted that operate to the detriment of the poor, 
Congress will again adjust the tax system to restore its preferred distributive 
pattern. This assumption amounts to a “law of conservation” of 
redistribution; whatever redistribution the current political equilibrium 
allows is exactly the amount that will occur, no more and no less, regardless 
of the methods of redistribution.  
On this account, undertaking redistribution through legal rules or non-
tax legislation will, at best, substitute a less efficient redistributive 
mechanism for redistribution that Congress would have otherwise 
implemented through the tax system; at worst, it will trigger a 
countervailing distributive move that undoes the redistribution while 
leaving behind the behavioral distortions. Redistributive legal rules or social 
policies that will inevitably either crowd out more efficient redistribution or 
draw costly countermoves cannot improve the distributive picture. If the 
amount of redistribution is fixed, then it is obvious that one should want to 
accomplish that redistribution in the most efficient way.  
Far from being a mere detail or sideline, the invariance hypothesis is the 
logical linchpin of tax superiority. Importantly, K&S, along with many law 
and economics scholars, maintain a position of distributive agnosticism; 
they do not commit themselves to any particular social welfare function but 
rather appear open to any welfarist approach, including ones that give 
weight to the way in which welfare is distributed.55 Consistent with that 
stance, their categorical claim of tax superiority applies regardless of how 
welfare is aggregated or how heavily a given social welfare function 
weights the well-being of subsets of the population.56 But universal tax 
                                                 
55  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare 27 (2002) (“[W]e do not defend any 
specific way of aggregating individuals’ well-being; that is, we do not endorse any particular view about the 
proper distribution of well-being or income.”); id. at 28-31 (explaining the ways in which a welfarist approach 
might call for redistribution, including the possibility that “more weight might be placed on the well-being of less-
well-off individuals”); see also Shavell, supra note 30, at 597 (observing that welfare economics encompasses “a 
vast multitude of ways of aggregating individual utilities,” including approaches in which “more equal 
distributions of utility may be superior to less equal distributions,” without specifying any one method). This 
agnosticism about distributive matters is sometimes couched in terms of lack of expertise. See, e.g., James J. 
Heckman, The Intellectual Roots of the Law and Economics Movement, 15 Law & Hist. Rev. 327 (1997) 
(“Knight, Robbins, Samuelson, and all modem economists . . . . explicitly state in their writings that they have no 
competence to assess the “appropriate”  distribution of resources and they do not sanction any particular 
distribution of resources, much less the existing one.”) (emphasis in original).   
56 See Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law at 107 (“[D]istributional equity under any measure of social 
welfare is better pursued through our income tax (and welfare) system than through any other social policy.”); see 
also Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 19, at 667 (observing that criticisms about the neglect of 
distributive issues in economic analysis of law “would be moot if the income tax system—understood here to 
include possible transfer payments to the poor—could be used freely to achieve any desired distribution of 
income” before discussing labor-leisure distortions that impede such free redistribution),  
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superiority can logically coexist with true distributive agnosticism only if 
one assumes that any distributive pattern that is achievable at all can 
actually be achieved through the tax system.  
To demonstrate, let us assume the opposite: that some distributive 
outcome, call it Outcome R, can only be achieved and maintained through 
resort (at least in part) to redistributive legal rules. If one is truly agnostic 
about distribution, then one cannot exclude the possibility that Outcome R 
maximizes overall social welfare. It follows directly from distributive 
agnosticism that Outcome R might dominate the closest politically 
achievable all-tax alternative, Outcome T, on purely distributive grounds. 
But true distributive agnosticism also implies that distributive differences 
can be given any weight whatsoever when trading them off against 
efficiency losses. A welfarist might weight distributive differences heavily 
due to the way in which a particular social welfare function aggregates the 
welfare of different people, or because of the way that wealth differences 
actually influence the welfare of individuals under particular social 
conditions.57 On some imaginable social welfare function, then, combined 
with some set of welfare-relevant facts, the distributive gains from Outcome 
R relative to Outcome T would outweigh the efficiency advantages of 
Outcome T relative to Outcome R.   
Only if the invariance hypothesis is categorically true can we rule out 
the possibility of welfare-maximizing outcomes that are uniquely 
achievable through resort to non-tax methods.  Once variance in achievable 
distributive results is established, the fact that a particular legal rule will 
perform better on a given distributive metric should receive as much 
attention in a welfarist analysis as the fact that a particular legal rule will 
perform better on the efficiency metric.58 If a more welfare-enhancing 
distributive pattern is politically possible through a combination of tax and 
non-tax law than through tax law alone, we face the following trade-off: 
suffer the distortions associated with adding nontax redistributive methods 
to the mix, or suffer the distributive deficits associated with forgoing those 
methods. Because it is not possible to know a priori which alternative will 
be less costly in welfare terms, the claim of universal tax superiority fails.  
 
C.  The Existing Literature and the Invariance Hypothesis 
 
We will now examine how the invariance hypothesis has been treated in 
the literature, both to establish that this principle has been recognized and to 
suggest that its significance has been largely neglected. We note at the 
                                                 
57 See supra note 23 (discussing some of the ways that wealth differences can influence welfare). 
58 The idea of distributive variance thus stands in for the more intuitive idea of a move toward (or away 
from) distributive optimality.   
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outset that what we call the invariance hypothesis is not a single, clearly 
stated proposition but rather a mostly unacknowledged premise revealed in 
scattered remarks. Moreover, there are at least two distinct ways that the 
hypothesis might be understood, each of which finds some support in the 
existing literature. First, it might be understood as an assumption within the 
K&S model, and hence as an explicit qualification on the model’s results.59 
Second, it might be understood as a truth-claim about the world: that our 
political system in fact exhibits distributive invariance. We argue that 
invariance is false as a factual matter. To the extent it is understood as a 
modeling assumption, its falsity strongly limits the real world application of 
tax superiority in a way that has not been generally appreciated.60  
Our literature review begins with the 1979 article that K&S repeatedly 
cite: Aanund Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives 
Should Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design.61 As Shavell says 
in his 1981 paper, when noting the parallel nature of the result, “the choice 
of a legal rule may be likened to the choice of a [government] project.”62 
Interesting, then, is the way that Hylland and Zeckhauser qualify their 
result. After observing that “[r]eal life” political decisions about distribution 
are often made in a piecemeal fashion, contrary to their model, they explain 
that an unclear and partial relationship between these decisions could lead 
to different levels of distribution across different distributive methods and 
domains: 
 
[O]ur results suggest that the group [with distributional goals] 
should emphasize tax strategies, but other programs should not 
necessarily be neglected. . . . For example, a group which works for 
increased well being for the poor may achieve greater success by 
urging subsidies for low-income housing than by advocating cash 
grants to the same low-income groups. That is, the former type of 
                                                 
59 There are some difficulties with this reading. While models often bracket large segments of reality to 
make analysis more tractable, an invariance assumption would mean that K&S were bracketing the availability of 
a political process capable of achieving the desired distributive result through tax-and-transfer—in other words, 
they were bracketing tax availability in a model purporting to show tax superiority. This would not be problematic 
if we cast K&S’s point as a theoretical exercise rather than as a basis for policy, as discussed below. See note 159 
and accompanying text, infra.    
60 An analogy can be drawn here to the way in which Robert Nozick’s ideas have been used to support 
arguments against redistribution. Nozick famously eschewed any “patterned” distributive goal in favor the actual 
distributions produced under certain strong assumptions about the history of acquisition and transfer. See Robert 
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 155-60 (1974); see also id. at 150-53 (setting out the conditions that would, 
under his approach, justify the resulting entitlements). Nozick himself noted the implications of these predicate 
conditions failing, even if his readers often ignored this point. Nozick, supra, at 152; 230-31 (explaining that his 
“principle of rectification” could call for more state intervention, potentially including approaches like the one 
endorsed by John Rawls). Similarly, to the extent K&S meant to present the invariance assumption as a strong 
qualification on their results, most law and economics scholars have either failed to receive that message or chose 
to ignore it.   
61 Aanund Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should Affect Taxes but Not Program 
Choice or Design, 81 Scandinavian J. Econ. 264 (1979). 
62 See Shavell, supra note 19, at 418. 
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support may be more acceptable to the higher-income people who 
will have to pay the subsidy. . . .63  
 
Hylland and Zeckhauser go on to observe that the different perspectives of 
“goods egalitarians” and “income egalitarians” could alter the degree to 
which tax progressivity would respond to changes in other distributive 
programs.64  
 This theme is also found in the work of Kaplow and Shavell, 
although it is not presented as a formal assumption of their model. In his 
1981 article, Shavell states the qualification quite strongly:  
 
[I]f the income tax would not be altered on adoption of new 
liability rules, then in strict logic the argument given for use of 
efficient rules does not apply. Now, of course, no one would really 
expect the income tax structure to be adjusted in response to each 
and every change in legal rules (much less to individual changes in 
other domains), for this would be impractical. Therefore, one’s 
attitude toward the result under discussion will depend on his 
expectation that the income tax would be (or could be) altered in 
response to changes in legal rules whenever these changes resulted 
in a ‘sufficiently important’ shift in the distribution of income.65 
 
By the time of the 1994 joint article, however, K&S present the 
qualification in a manner that suggests an empirical conjecture: 
 
An argument sometimes offered in favor of redistribution 
through legal rules is that the tax system falls short of optimal 
redistributive taxation--perhaps because of the balance of political 
power in the legislature. This argument raises questions that we do 
not seek to address about the function of courts in a democracy. In 
any case, it seems unlikely that courts can accomplish significant 
redistribution through the legal system without attracting the 
attention of legislators.66  
 
This passage suggests that if optimally redistributive taxes are politically 
infeasible,67 there is little prospect of welfare-enhancing distributive 
                                                 
63  Hylland and Zeckhauser, supra note 61, at 282. 
64 Id. at 283.  
65 Shavell, supra note 19, at 417.  
66 Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient supra note 19, at 675.  
67 The potential infeasibility of optimally redistributive taxes has often been noted. See, e.g., Meurer, supra 
note 2, at 970 n.117; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 314-15; Daniel A. Farber and Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) 
Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1817, 1826 (2003); Scott Shapiro & Edward F. 
McClennen, Law-and-Economics from a Philosophical Perspective, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
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changes outside the realm of tax either. On this account, the very same 
congressional barriers to achieving the best distribution via tax will also 
impede the achievement of the best distribution through legal doctrine, 
because distributive changes will be offset.68  
Shavell makes the point more categorically in a book designed for 
beginning students.69 There, he asks the question, “What if the wrong 
people—whoever you think they are—control the income tax system? Isn’t 
there, then, an argument for redistributing through law?” His answer: “Not 
really. Suppose, for instance, that you want the poor to have more wealth, 
so you make it easier for them to bring suit and collect large judgments. But 
if the people in control of taxes don’t want the poor to get more, presumably 
they can just raise taxes on the poor (or reduce credits that the poor enjoy) 
so as to counter the change you sought to effect.”70 In a later book, 
however, he again acknowledges that the argument for tax superiority 
would not apply “[i]f the political process is imperfect not only in failing to 
achieve society’s redistributive goals, but also in failing to offset attempts to 
redistribute through the choice of legal rules.”71 
Kaplow’s separate work on distribution-neutral public policies provides 
further insight into his understanding of how tax offsetting operates.72 In a 
                                                                                                                            
Economics and the Law 460, 463 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Indeed, there is little reason to think that Congress 
consciously structures the tax system to maximize welfare.   
68 The passage also embeds an apparent normative suggestion that courts may be inferior institutionally to 
make distributive decisions. This is a separate point from one premised on invariance and indeed only becomes 
relevant to the extent there is variance.  See Part III.B.3 infra.   
69 Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law 108, Box 17 (2004).  
70 Id.  Likewise, the teacher’s manual of a recent casebook coauthored by Shavell includes the following: 
  
Suppose that someone says that those in control of the political system, and thus of the 
income tax system, do not have the socially correct view of how much wealth should be 
redistributed toward the poor. Would it then make sense for [someone] to recommend 
taking distributional considerations generally into account in policymaking, such in 
considering whether to place ceilings on drug prices? 
Answer: Those in control of the political system will offset attempts to 
redistribute...and we will wind up hurting drug co. incentives and not helping poor. 
 
Teacher’s Manual for the casebook, Jackson, Kaplow, Shavell, Viscusi, and Cope's Analytical 
Methods for Lawyers 673-674 (or VI-59-60) (Foundation Press, 2d. ed., 2010) (ellipses in original). 
71 Shavell, supra note 30, at 659-60.    
72  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 
Nat’l Tax J. 513 (1996) [hereinafter, Kaplow, Public Goods]; Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in 
the Presence of Income Taxation, 53 Int’l Econ. Rev. 487 (2012) [hereinafter, Kaplow, Externalities]. These 
pieces are not centered on the normative claim that legal rules should not redistribute. Indeed, the 2012 
Externalities piece declares itself to be “a theoretical exercise,” not a basis for policy. See Kaplow, Externalities, 
supra, at 499, 503. Rather, these pieces show how policies that would appear to have distributive implications 
(and, relatedly, impacts on the magnitude of the labor-leisure distortion) can be made distribution-neutral through 
countervailing adjustments in the tax system, altering the way in which those policies should be evaluated in the 
first instance. The common thread is the claim that the tax system is well suited to make the necessary distributive 
adjustments to produce a desired level of redistribution, regardless of what happens in other. The 2000 joint K&S 
article thus characterized the 1996 Public Goods article as “a much more general version of the argument” from 
the joint 1994 paper.  See Louis Kaplow, & Steven M. Shavell. "Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying 
the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income," 29 Journal of Legal Studies 821, 824 
(2000).   
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1996 article that focuses on the funding of public goods, a qualified 
empirical conjecture in favor of distributive invariance can be seen in this 
takeaway:  
 
To be sure, one would not expect tax adjustments to offset the 
benefits of new public projects completely and precisely. 
Nevertheless, if one had to guess, it seems plausible that roughly, on 
average, and over time, changes in the level of public goods will 
tend to be accompanied by tax adjustments that offset changes in the 
distributive incidence of the benefits produced by those goods.73 
 
More recently, in a paper addressing externality control, Kaplow queries the 
degree to which distribution-neutral policies could be implemented “as a 
practical and political matter,” observing that “[e]ven a legislature that 
desired to offset distributive effects would be unlikely to do so with 
precision” where a policy generates “intricate” distributive impacts.74 In an 
earlier footnote, however, he repeats the “conjecture” that “such reforms 
will, on average, tend to leave the preexisting political equilibrium 
regarding the extent of redistribution unaltered.”75 A similar mix of claims, 
conjectures, and qualifications appear in other work.76 
As this review reveals, some articulations of invariance assert that 
Congress will offset conscious efforts at distributive improvement 
undertaken by courts or other governmental entities, to the extent those 
efforts produce distributive results that deviate from congressional 
preferences. We might think of this as “aspirational invariance”—the claim 
that any effort to use legal rules to improve distribution (according to some 
metric) beyond the level indicated by the current political equilibrium will 
be countered by an adjustment to the tax-and-transfer system that will return 
distribution to its baseline condition. In the examples above, the claim 
                                                 
73 Kaplow, Public Goods, supra note 72, at 521.  
74 Kaplow, Externalities, supra note __, at 499. 
75 Id. at 498, n.10. 
76 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice 
and Efficiency, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 79, 97 (2007) (observing, in the intergenerational context, that “if one had to 
predict a priori the most likely long-run distributive impact of a policy change, distribution neutrality would be 
the best guess” but stressing that this “is merely a conjecture of what may tend to be true roughly, on average, 
and in the long run, not a precise description of any particular political reality”); Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness 
versus Welfare supra note __, at 35 n.39 (rehearsing invariance arguments and concluding that “it seems unlikely 
that judges could succeed in implementing a regime that was significantly more or less redistributive than the one 
favored by the legislature”); Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to 
Government Policy, 18 J Econ Persp 159, 172-73 (Fall 2004) (observing that “[i]f one had to speculate about 
how redistribution would ultimately tend to be affected by government projects, it seems plausible to suppose, as 
a first approximation, that the long-run political equilibrium regarding redistribution will not be affected in an 
obvious, predictable manner by this or that government action,” making distributive neutrality a useful construct, 
even though “the political process is far more complicated than this”); see also Yew-Kwang Ng, Quasi-Pareto 
Social Improvements, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 1033, 1040 (1984) (positing that “[e]specially in the long run, the 
forces that operate to prevent redistribution through taxation will also operate to prevent redistribution by other 
means” but noting that “actual political decisions are affected by a host of factors”). 
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would be that we should not aspire to improve distribution by selecting a 
new but inefficient rule regarding arbitration of contract disputes, tort 
damages for lost income, teacher tenure, military conscription, and so on, 
since any apparent improvement will be undone. 
But there is another facet of invariance, which we call “corrective 
invariance,” that must also be true in order for tax superiority to hold. 
Corrective invariance refers to the claim that a legal rule or policy that 
worsens distribution (according to some metric) will not have any lasting 
unwanted effect on distributive results because it will be corrected through 
tax-and-transfer.77 Suppose, to maximize wealth, we would need to adopt a 
new legal rule regarding arbitration, tort damages, teacher tenure, or 
military conscription, and this rule will adversely affect distribution. 
Corrective invariance counsels us to ignore this distributive deficit and 
adopt the rule because Congress can and will offset the loss through a 
change in tax-and-transfer. In sum, aspirational invariance holds that it is 
impossible for courts or policymakers to make the distribution better, while 
corrective invariance holds that it is impossible for them to make the 
distribution worse.78   
These are the claims we reject. Of course, K&S do not assert that 
invariance (of either form) is true in an absolute sense as an empirical 
matter. But however one might understand their position(s) on the matter, 
the implications for tax superiority have not been generally appreciated. 
With a few exceptions,79 the received wisdom seems to accept tax 
superiority without confronting or even raising the issue of invariance.80  
Our goal here is to bring invariance to a position of prominence equal to 
that held by the zero transaction cost assumption.  As we establish below, 
invariance is equally false, and in ways that are just as policy-relevant.        
                                                 
77 The notion of corrective invariance encompasses not just instances in which courts or policymakers enact 
new rules or laws that affirmatively worsen distribution, but also inaction by governmental entities when 
economic or social conditions produce distributive deficits that they would be in a position to address. Tax 
superiority would assert that these deficits can always be addressed more cheaply through tax and transfer—
assuming the political equilibrium allows them to be addressed at all. This last point connects to the possibility 
that changing distributions alter the political equilibrium and change what it is possible to achieve distributively.  
See infra note 171 and accompanying text.      
78 We are not aware of anyone previously drawing a clear distinction between these two facets of invariance. 
A focus on the aspirational flavor of invariance understates the impact of the distributive message associated with 
the principle of tax superiority. It is not just a matter of recommending that courts and policymakers leave 
distributive improvements to the tax system (what most of us would think of as “redistribution”); tax superiority 
actually prescribes standing by as legal rules and policies make distributions worse in the name of efficiency, on 
the (empirically unsupported) faith in a countervailing correction. 
79 To be sure, a few observations along these lines have appeared in existing law and economics scholarship. 
The most extended discussion of which we are aware is found in Markovits, supra note 5. Adler and Posner also 
appear to expressly recognize the possibility of variance when they observe (in a discussion of whether and how 
cost-benefit analysis should account for wealth distortions) that “it might be the case that welfare-improving 
transfers through the tax and welfare system are not made because Congress has other things on its mind, and not 
because the optimal distribution of wealth has been achieved.”  Id. at 144-45.  
80 Our research suggests that references to K&S’s views favoring tax-and-transfer almost never mention the 
point.   The political infeasibility of optimally redistributive taxes is a not uncommon critique, but scholars do not 
often address K&S’s invariance response to that critique.   
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II. THE INVARIANCE HYPOTHESIS IS FALSE 
 
So far, we have established that the claim of tax superiority depends on 
an assumption of distributive invariance that in turn embeds the assumption 
that political action costs for tax adjustments are equal to or less than the 
political action costs of any alternative method of distributing the same 
quantum of income. Having pointed out the centrality of invariance, we 
now go further to explain why the invariance hypothesis is false. Even the 
bare assumption that action is costlier than inaction produces enough 
variance to make implausible the idea that distributive results would remain 
unchanged no matter how we set up legal rules and institutions.81 But there 
are many other reasons to question invariance, including the fact that 
distributive efforts are carried out at multiple levels of a federal system, that 
psychological phenomena like framing and salience influence political 
acceptability, and that fairness preferences play a role in producing political 
results. 
For all these reasons, we would expect to see variation in political action 
costs, which we define broadly to capture all of the impediments parties 
encounter in achieving desired distributive outcomes through legal 
coercion, whether through legislation, litigation, or regulation.  While a full 
explication of the types and determinants of political action costs lies 
beyond the scope of the present project, it is helpful to briefly classify them 
in a chronological manner similar to the taxonomy that Carl Dahlman used 
(and Coase later embraced) for transaction costs.82 In Dahlman’s schema, 
there are “search and information costs,” “bargaining and decision costs,” 
and “policing and enforcement costs.” Parallels can be found in the context 
of political action. 
Proponents of a distributive change must initially identify opportunities 
to carry out shifts in the desired direction, whether those shifts involve new 
changes or offsets of undesired changes. After this search or opportunity-
spotting phase is complete, costs must be incurred to bring the proposed 
distributive change to the attention of a relevant decisionmaking body and 
convince the decisionmaker to undertake it. These costs include 
coordinating collective action, framing the proposal, lobbying or litigating 
for it, and so on. This might be understood as a decision influencing stage 
designed to bring the party in power to the point of deciding to carry out the 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., Barak Orbach, A State of Inaction: Regulatory Preferences, Rent, and Income Inequality, 
forthcoming Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2014). 
82 See R.H. Coase, The Firm, The Market, and the Law 6 (1988) (quoting Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of 
Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Robert C. Ellickson, 
The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 Yale L.J. 611, 614-16 (1989) (noting temporal organization of 
this taxonomy and proposing a functional alternative). 
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distributive change. Finally, there is an execution, enforcement, and 
maintenance phase that consists of actually undertaking the costs to effect 
the distributive shift and ensuring that the efforts are not sidelined or 
undone by others.83  
With these three broad phases in mind, we turn to some of the 
mechanisms that could cause these costs to be higher or lower depending on 
the distributive avenue elected. 
 
A.  Offsets and Inertia 
 
 The invariance hypothesis is premised on the ability of Congress to 
offset distributive changes occurring elsewhere in the system (whether to 
correct maldistributions unintentionally generated by other actors, or to beat 
back aspirational efforts to change distribution in ways that clash with 
congressional preferences). Taken literally, the hypothesis assumes that it is 
no more costly for Congress to restore its preferred distributive pattern after 
a disruption to it than it is to maintain it in the absence of that disruption. A 
focus on political action costs suggests several reasons why restoration 
might be more costly than mere continuation of the preexisting distributive 
pattern. First, there are search and information costs in noticing that there is 
a distributive change to counteract and assessing what it would take to 
counteract it. Second, there may be costs that fall into the decision-
influencing stage, to the extent that the very existence of the target 
distributive action has altered the political equilibrium—whether by 
creating entrenched, concentrated interests who are now invested in not 
losing what they have gained, demonstrating the wisdom of the distributive 
change in question, or otherwise.84 Third, there are costs in simply 
implementing and executing the offsetting action.   
 
1. Imprecise and Incomplete Offsetting 
 
Kaplow and Shavell separately acknowledge that offsetting is likely to 
be less than absolute. Shavell says “no one would really expect the income 
tax structure to be adjusted in response to each and every change in legal 
rules.”85 Kaplow states: “one would not expect tax adjustments to offset the 
                                                 
83 Thus, the political action costs of realizing a desired distributive pattern depend in part on how costly it is 
for a body with contrary preferences to counteract the change. If countermands are costless, the political action 
costs of achieving change through the selected body are infinite. This category of executing, enforcing, and 
maintaining also overlaps to some degree with administrative costs that have been discussed in prior analyses. See 
supra note 30. Although a welfarist analysis would count all costs, our interest in this paper is in drawing attention 
to the previously neglected costs of overcoming impediments that are political rather than administrative in nature.     
84 See, eg., Markovits, supra note 5 at 599-601; [see also temporary law for demonstration effects] 
85 Shavell, supra note 19, at 417.  
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benefits of new public projects completely and precisely.”86 Thus, for 
example, if Congress funds the creation of dams for flood control or places 
military bases in economically depressed areas and thereby redistributes to 
the poor, we would not expect Congress to “completely and precisely” 
offset that form of non-tax redistribution with an adjustment to taxes that 
recoups that benefit from the poor.  
Both imprecision and incompleteness in offsetting deserve attention. 
Offsetting is imprecise to the extent that it does not restore all individuals to 
their pre-change distributive status. K&S contemplate that Congress will 
use a broad-based tax instrument keyed to income to offset the distributive 
effects of a legal rule that affects only a subset of the population in ways 
that correlate only roughly with income. As a result, offsetting will 
necessarily be haphazard and imprecise. Distributive invariance, then, can at 
most mean something like preserving a society-wide Gini coefficient87 or 
ensuring that members of particular income deciles or quartiles fare equally 
well or poorly, on average. Depending on the particular social welfare 
function in use, however, this may or may not count as an equivalent 
distributive result.  
Incomplete offsetting means that some non-tax distributive changes will 
stick. This means it is possible to increase, to some unspecified degree, the 
amount of redistribution by adding non-tax mechanisms to the tax 
mechanism. It also means that unwanted distributive changes that might 
accompany the adoption of efficient legal rules will go uncorrected to at 
least some extent.  If we should expect imprecise and incomplete offsetting 
of the distributive effects of the legislature’s own handiwork, we would 
expect offsetting to be even less precise and complete when another 
governmental body (e.g., the courts or administrative agencies, or any of the 
fifty states or the tens of thousands of local jurisdictions) does the 
redistribution. Congress would presumably be less aware of, and feel less 
electoral accountability for the redistribution carried out by other 
governmental bodies. 
 
2. Legislative Inertia  
 
The qualifications above dovetail with the well discussed ideas of 
legislative inertia and entrenchment. A standard observation is that it is 
easier to maintain the status quo than to change it. Congressional 
bicameralism and the committee system, not to mention the Senatorial 
filibuster, create multiple legislative veto points, and parliamentary 
                                                 
86 Kaplow, Public Goods, supra note 72, at 521. 
87 The Gini coefficient measures the amount of income inequality in a society by plotting a curve that depicts 
the share of income earned by each income percentile (the Lorenz Curve) and then generating a ratio that reflects 
the “sag” of the curve compared with a perfectly proportionate income dispersion. [cite]. 
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procedure allows party leaders to set the agenda, all of which makes it 
possible to defeat legislation that is supported by the median voter. Because 
there are political costs to enacting legislative changes to the status quo, 
existing law can diverge to some degree from legislative preferences 
(however that is understood, such as the preferences of the median 
legislator).  
Consider statutory interpretation. Courts have some latitude in 
interpreting statutes because the legislature will not overturn every decision 
that diverges even slightly from its preferred outcome. The literature on 
strategic judging posits that judges seek to indulge their policy preferences 
to the maximum degree possible without overstepping the bounds of 
legislative inertia.88 The complexities of political organizing to overcome 
collective action problems in the formation of winning coalitions mean that 
tactical victories (such as those achieved in court) can lead to strategic 
victories.89 Distributive invariance would require a political process that is 
far more simple and deterministic than the one we appear to have.  
The inertia we see in legislative action logically extends to the issue of 
distribution. However, there are some differences in the tax-and-transfer 
realm. Perhaps most significantly, getting taxes on the agenda and 
implementing changes to them is trivial; there is major tax reform every few 
years, and there are annual technical changes such as adjusting the 
alternative minimum tax (AMT).90 Search and information costs—here, 
knowing what distributive changes have occurred that might require 
offsetting—might also be streamlined through aggregate data about 
distribution.91  Yet the fact that Congress routinely makes technical changes 
to the tax code and has access to useful data compilations does not mean 
that it revisits fundamental distributive policy regularly, much less that it 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller and Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of 
Supreme Court Decisions, 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 503, 503 (1996) (noting that “recent positive political analyses 
of Supreme Court decision making . . . emphasized that the Court makes its [statutory] decisions in a way that 
insulates them from legislative override. The Court, for example, may make a decision that takes advantage of the 
legislative decision-making process (such as bicameralism . . . or the committee system), which can insure against 
a legislative override.”). See also Alicia Uribe, James F. Spriggs II, and Thomas G. Hansford, The Influence of 
Congressional Preferences of Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions, 48 Law & Soc'y Rev. 921 
(2014); John A. Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & 
Econ. 263 (1992).  
89 These complexities help to solve a puzzle that our rejection of distributive invariance presents: why the 
forces contending over distribution would not deploy their resources in such a manner as to equalize resistance to 
unwanted changes in each arena, rather than effectively overinvesting in resistance in some arenas relative to 
others. An answer may be found in the varying nature of collective action necessary to pursue or resist certain 
distributive goals in different contexts. If, for example, stopping redistribution through legal rules allows more 
free-riding by parties affected by the new rule than stopping redistribution through tax-and-transfer, more 
investments may be made in the latter than the former. Cf. Dhammika Dharmapala The Congressional Budget 
Process, Aggregate Spending, and Statutory Budget Rules, J. Pub. Econ. 2006.  
90 See Weisbach, supra note 52, at 35 (citing estimates of 15,000 tax code changes since 1986). 
91 See id. at 36. But see K&S 1994 at 675 (observing that it may remain important to trace distributive 
effects of legal rules “because those formulating income tax policy need to be aware of any significant distributive 
effects of legal rules that would not otherwise be apparent, such as from studying information on the actual 
distribution of income.”). 
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persistently returns distribution to some single set point. We suspect that 
distribution is subject to political cycling and that some method of 
entrenchment of any given result is necessary to terminate cycling through 
all distributive possibilities.92 Once in place, interest groups will exploit 
legislative veto points to defend their distributional benefits.93 As a result, 
we would not expect to see redistributive legal rules consistently 
counteracted, either a la carte or en masse.94  
Here we note one interesting source of distributive entrenchment that 
we think features in a lot of tax and non-tax distribution: coalition-building 
through leakage. As we noted above, another standard (but merely 
contingent) reason to oppose redistribution through non-tax law is that it 
will be poorly targeted, causing a form of redistributive leakage. If we 
assume that redistribution is appropriately targeted at those who have lower 
incomes, then a tax rule that is based on a precise measurement of incomes 
will select suitable recipients more accurately than will a legal rule that 
depends on a proxy for income or wealth.95 Such a legal rule will 
sometimes redistribute away from, rather than toward, the intended targets.  
Yet this apparent defect of leakage could be a feature rather than a bug 
for those seeking redistribution, depending on how it changes the costs of 
political action. Those who benefit from leakage are induced to prefer the 
redistributive scheme that produces it. This is why universalist welfare 
programs enjoy greater politically stability than targeted programs and may 
accomplish more redistribution to the poor despite not being limited to that 
                                                 
92 See John C. Roberts and Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to 
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1773, 1814-16 (2003) (identifying reasons that the structure and 
process of legislation works to entrench existing legislation); Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, Legislative Process 
677-85 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining how the process of legislation works to make change difficult). 
93 See citations from supra note __. See also Francis Fukuyama, Oh For a Democratic Dictatorship and Not a 
Vetocracy, Fin. Times (Nov. 22, 2011, 5:27 PM), http:// www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d82776c6-14fd-11e1-a2a6-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1zg7rjoNs (describing the contemporary American form of government as a veto-cracy). 
Put differently, the asymmetry between the political action costs of preserving the status quo and changing it 
produce path dependence in distributive legislation. Compare Bradley A. Hansen and Mary Eschelbach Hansen, 
The role of path dependence in the development of US bankruptcy law, 1880–1938, 3 J. Inst’l. Econ. 203 (2007); 
Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance 
Systems, 26 Del J Corp L 147 (2001). See generally Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q J Polit Sci 87 (2006) 
(reviewing the use of path dependence in political science theory). 
94 See, e.g., Markovits at 600, for some reasons why such countering might not occur, including “the fact 
that legislators may have to incur special costs to pass legislation that in effect reverses judicial decisions, changes 
the jurisdiction of the courts, controls who is appointed to the courts, or packs the courts.” Markovits goes on to 
observe that the judicial decision may itself “deter legislative efforts to offset the redistributions the court 
effectuated by changing the information, distributional value, or awareness of the concrete implications of given 
distributional values of the members of the legislature in question and/or their constituents,” or otherwise alerting 
the legislature to how much a particular distributive change is valued. Id. at 600-01. 
95 Income is not, of course, the only possible metric for redistribution. Income is often viewed as a mere 
proxy for the real variable of interest, ability. Moreover, there are many ways that people can become less well off 
that might be more appropriately measured through metrics other than income. For example, they might be less 
healthy or less happy. Without endorsing income as the best possible target for all redistributive efforts, we will 
assume for purposes of the present discussion that it is the relevant variable, and that legal rules are likely to be 
less good than tax rules at identifying recipients. See Logue and Avraham. If some other metric of well-being 
measured who should be the target of redistributive efforts, legal rules might actually do a better job of targeting 
in some cases. [Sanchirico, Logue & Avraham].  
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purpose.96 Similarly, a judicial decision aimed at benefiting the mostly poor 
neighbors of a polluting factory might be less prone to being undone 
legislatively if it also incidentally benefitted a few wealthy neighbors with 
political clout.97 If the political assistance of the wealthy neighbors is 
pivotal – the legislature overrules the court if and only if the sole 
beneficiaries are the poor – then leakage produces more redistribution than 
no leakage.98 Whatever one may think of this normatively, the possibility 
that it can happen (without being legislatively undone) disproves the 
invariance hypothesis. 
 
3. Offsetting and Inertia in a Federal System 
 
 There are additional reasons to doubt that distributive changes will be 
counterbalanced to produce an invariant distributive outcome. First is the 
fact that there are fifty states and tens of thousands of local governments 
that are involved in making distributive choices,99 both through taxation 
choices and the development of legal rules and policies that affect 
distribution.100 The conventional wisdom is that all redistribution should 
occur at centralized levels to avoid the problem of a tax base with feet.101 If 
people can simply move to avoid being on the losing end of redistribution, 
local redistributive efforts will accomplish nothing more than introducing 
costly distortions in locational decisions. Nonetheless, states and localities 
often undertake efforts that have redistributive aims,102 and at least some of 
these efforts are likely to redistribute in the contemplated direction to some 
extent. How do these real-world efforts fit into the invariance hypothesis? 
                                                 
96 See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support Redistribution? Law, Social Preferences, and 
Sustainable Policy Design, 64 Tax L. Rev. 313 (2011) 
97 The example in the text assumes that a very precise legislative countermand would be sought—one that 
would turn all of the previous winners into losers and vice versa. This is where leakage would have political 
traction. If the offsetting were cruder so that it only lowered the position of low-income people in general, and did 
not reduce the position of those well-off people who fortuitously happened to win out through “leaky” legal rules, 
then the political advantage indicated in the text would not hold. However, in that case invariance would be 
independently undermined by the lack of precision in the countermand.  
98 Of course, the factory owner might respond in other ways in an effort to undo the distributive change. 
Perhaps the factory owner seeks an offset through a general tax change – e.g., a decrease in corporate tax rates – 
but that general change would have enormous political action costs, with most of the benefits going elsewhere. 
The factory owner might seek a unique tax benefit applicable only to it. Yet if the corporate owner has the 
political clout to acquire special tax treatment (or other benefits, such as factory-friendly infrastructure), we would 
need to know why this clout had not already been deployed.  
99 [Add updated census data here]. As of 2008, 39,044 general-purpose local governments (which includes 
counties, municipalities, and towns or townships). While local governments exhibit heterogeneity in terms of their 
powers to tax and to enact overtly redistributive policies, virtually all local governments hold the power to make 
choices that will have distributive implications.  
100 Brian Galle, Is Local Consumer Protection Law a Better Redistributive Mechanism than the Tax 
System?, 65 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 525, 530-40 (2010). 
101 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 
101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1057, 1058 (2007) (citing “conventional wisdom that localities should play little role in 
fulfilling the redistributive functions of government”).   
102 See id.  
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 Suppose that the Texas Supreme Court adopts a new approach to 
eminent domain compensation under the state Constitution that effectively 
increases the compensation provided to low-income displaced 
households.103 Texas does not have an income tax and therefore cannot 
make adjustments to it to counteract this change. Nor does it seem plausible 
that Congress would respond to this legal change in Texas by altering the 
structure of the federal income tax. It could alter the progressivity of the 
income tax generally, or adjust the EITC program, in order to produce a 
change that would bring the average distributive results back to a baseline, 
but only by affecting many people outside Texas, and many within Texas 
who did not suffer condemnations.104 A more targeted response would be 
possible, though it seems even less plausible.  For example, Congress could 
treat amounts of compensation received through the Texas program as 
offsets against any amounts the household would receive through the EITC. 
An empirical question is whether we actually observe such efforts to 
directly counteract distributive changes made at a lower level of 
government. If we do not, or do not always, then does it disprove the 
invariance hypothesis?105 Invariance proponents might argue that state and 
local distributive changes are not commonly undone because they 
contribute to the maximization of (what has just then become) society’s 
current social welfare function. This is a subspecies of a tautological theory 
we will have more to say about below.106  It suffices for now to observe that 
this argument would require us to make the highly unrealistic assumption 
that Congress is constantly evaluating the distributive incidence of all the 
policies (not just the tax policies) of tens of thousands of subnational 
jurisdictions in order to determine which tax changes to implement--and 
refrain from implementing--federally.107  
 
                                                 
103 Although this example involves a state, it could just as easily be an example involving a locality. For 
example, the City of Chicago might enact a housing policy that operates to the benefit of lower-income residents.   
104 Note that such an offset would only produce results that count as distributively equivalent under a social 
welfare function that is indifferent to whether people in, say, the entire bottom decile are benefited a little, or 
whether instead a small subset of geographically clustered people falling in that decile are benefited a lot. [cross 
reference earlier precision discussion]. 
105 Importantly, our focus here is on targeted responses that would directly counter specific redistributive 
efforts.  These kinds of countermands could not be informed by aggregate data in the manner suggested by 
Weisbach, supra note 52, at __.  Broader countermands directed at the income distribution generally, nationwide, 
are possible but would not likely produce meaningful distributive equivalence, as noted above.  See note 104, 
supra.   
106 See infra Part III.A.1.  
107 An alternative claim might be that the social welfare function is set independently by each state and 
locality, so that whatever we actually observe at the state or local level represents the invariant local distributive 
result for that particular place at that particular time. This is a problematic claim for economists to make, however, 
both because it cuts against the usual preference for centralized redistribution and because states and localities do 
not always even possess traditional tax and transfer tools. But see Brian Galle [cite] (positing that local 
redistributive efforts undertaken through non-tax means are less likely to suffer from the distortionary effects that 
local taxation is generally thought to occasion). 
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4. A Note About Magnitude  
 
Perhaps readers accept that the invariance hypothesis is technically 
false, but conjecture that the magnitude of variance is sufficiently small that 
the doctrine of tax superiority survives intact. Have K&S gotten things right 
to a first approximation, so that we are quibbling over the distributive 
equivalent of rounding errors? We do not think so. The discussion above 
provides ample support for the idea that distribution must diverge from 
Congress’s ideal point by some nontrivial amount before any corrective 
action will be taken. Changes short of this triggering amount fall within 
what we might call a Margin of Inaction (MOI). The sections below discuss 
some factors that can make corrective or countervailing congressional 
action slower to come, causing the MOI to grow. It is likely, therefore, that 
the MOI is large, at least in some contexts.  
Even a fixed and small MOI is devastating to the categorical claim of 
tax superiority, however. This is clear when we consider again the stance of 
distributive agnosticism taken by K&S and other legal economists. As long 
as legal rules can produce some durable distributive variance, that variance 
will be enough on some imaginable social welfare function to make a 
difference to welfare. This is enough to make the choice of distributive 
mechanism indeterminate.   
 Moreover, tax superiority has traction as a normative prescription only 
as contrasted with some other actually available means of redistribution.  
Thus, the crucial variable is not the absolute size of the MOI, but its size 
relative to the power courts and other governmental actors have to advance 
welfare through their distributive choices. Suppose, for example, that courts 
or executives adopt inefficient rules only when: (1) the inefficiency is small; 
(2)  they have good evidence that the rule will actually affect distribution in 
a welfare-enhancing direction (after accounting for haphazardness and 
contracting-around);108 and (3) doing so otherwise fits within the zone of 
discretion that they have been afforded within their institutional roles. If 
these worthwhile distributive opportunities are sufficiently scarce and 
limited in scope, the entire set of them may fall within even a relatively 
small MOI—meaning that if courts take every worthwhile opportunity to 
redistribute, they cannot cumulatively change distribution enough to trigger 
a congressional reaction.109   
 We need not assume that the MOI is fixed, of course.  We might expect 
                                                 
108 Although usually presented as complements to the K&S distortion argument, the contracting-around and 
haphazardness objections narrow the set of available distributive opportunities that might be exploited through 
legal rules. They therefore make it more likely that the remaining opportunities will fall within the operative MOI.   
109 It is possible, of course, that redistributive opportunities exceed the MOI. While this complicates the 
advice that welfarists might receive, as we discuss below, it does not alter the basic point that a positive MOI 
disproves invariance and with it the categorical claim of tax superiority.  See infra notes 172-176 and 
accompanying text.   
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it to vary depending on a variety of factors that influence the salience and 
political valence of different distributive shifts. For example, there might be 
a different trigger point for corrective offsetting than for aspirational 
offsetting. Thus, even if we posit that Congress will be relatively quick to 
counteract efforts to overtly improve distribution through non-tax means, it 
does not follow that it will be equally quick to correct the unintended 
distributive consequences of newly adopted efficient legal rules, much less 
that it will nimbly keep up with societal changes or rent-seeking 
opportunities that worsen distribution relative to its ideal point.110 The 
possibility that Congress will lag in its corrective role widens the space 
within which a court or other actor could effect distributive improvements. 
The following sections discuss a number of other reasons that offsetting 
behavior might vary depending on the source and characteristics of the 
distributive change. Although the questions are empirical ones, there is no 
reason to assume that the MOI is so small across all contexts as to make 
invariance a serviceable foundation for tax superiority.    
  
B.  Framing, Salience, and Cognitive Biases  
 
In recent years, large literatures have investigated how human cognitive 
features may systematically alter the perception of, and hence the response 
to, a variety of policies and legal rules. One line of analysis, which we will 
not revisit here, is whether the labor/leisure distortion thought to be 
common to all redistributive efforts is actually attenuated in some contexts 
by cognitive features like optimism.111 We are interested instead in how the 
packaging and framing of redistribution influences the political action costs 
of enacting and maintaining it.  
For example, one of the most consistent and important findings of 
prospect theory is that people weight losses more heavily than gains.112 
Thus, framing a particular interaction as one that produces a loss would be 
expected to generate more disutility and more political resistance than 
framing it as a mere failure to achieve a gain.113 Legal rules and policies 
                                                 
110 Rent-seeking by the rich is arguably a major cause of rising inequality. See Orbach, supra note 81; Gerrit 
De Geest, Removing Rents: Why the Legal System is Superior to the Income Tax at Reducing Income Inequality 
(2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2337720; Josh Bivens & Lawrence Michel, The Pay 
of Corporate Executives and Financial Professionals as Evidence of Rents in Top 1 Percent Incomes, 27 J. Econ 
Persp. 57 (2013); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (2011). 
111 See Jolls, supra note 26. For example, a legal rule that collects more from wealthy tortfeasors would 
apply only to the subset of wealthy people involved in accidents—the odds of which people are likely to 
underestimate. A counterargument raised by Logue and Avraham is that insurance markets could turn the 
uncertain loss into a more certain one. Though we find Jolls’s arguments somewhat persuasive (even differential 
insurance rates are likely to be noticed less than overt redistribution), nothing in this paper depends on accepting 
them. Our arguments apply whether the assumption that the labor/leisure distortion is invariant across methods of 
redistribution is true or false.  
112 Kahneman & Tversky 
113 [add cites] 
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that have distributive implications might be susceptible of either frame, 
depending on how they are presented and perceived. Although design 
details can accentuate or downplay this effect, tax-and-transfer mechanisms 
tend to highlight the taking away of something from a person who had 
previously been endowed with it, and hence are likely to set off cognitive 
alarms that might be more muted where institutional arrangements assign 
resources in a different manner in the first instance. Consider this example: 
 
Human Organs. Imagine that at the moment a new 
transplant technology becomes medically possible, the state 
enacts a law that does two things: (1) it permits medical 
institutions, under some circumstances, to buy certain human 
organs; and (2) it effectively prohibits individuals from 
purchasing organs, forcing allocation by some institutional 
notion of medical need.  
 
This rule has a strong distributive effect favoring the poor (the poor 
would have the option of selling, but would not have to outbid the rich to 
obtain organs). Yet because it is enacted at the moment that transplantation 
surgery first becomes possible, the fact that the wealthy cannot outbid the 
poor for their organs is unlikely to be experienced as a loss. The rule 
prevents the value of wealth from rising by forbidding one possible new 
use,114 but nothing is “taken” from the wealthy, not money nor a previously 
exercised privilege. The alternative policy, based on tax superiority, might 
instead tax the rich and use the revenue to give the poor more money, which 
they could use for buying organs if they so chose. In this case, however, the 
added tax would take away money the rich had previously earned (even 
though they would receive implicit compensation by now being able to use 
the rest of their wealth to bid for organs in an open market, albeit against 
poor people who are now somewhat less poor). Here, the non-tax 
mechanism plausibly has lower political action costs than the tax 
mechanism.  
Although the timing of the distributive rule to coincide with the 
emergence of a new technology helps to do the framing work in Human 
Organs, other factors such as bundling can also contribute to framing. 
Consider: 
 
Landfill. An agency must choose a neighborhood in 
which to site a landfill. Such a locally undesirable land use 
will cause property values in the surrounding area to fall. 
                                                 
114 [cites regarding sphere of money and how it influences decisions to earn and accumulate wealth; Sandel, 
Walzer]. 
32 Fennell & McAdams [1-Jan-15 
Because this drop in property values will likely result in 
lower-income people living near the landfill (whether they 
were there initially or not) there is an efficiency case for 
placing the landfill in the less wealthy neighborhood.115 
Suppose this causes an unwanted distributive result—making 
people who are already less well-off even worse off. This 
distributive problem could be addressed in one of two ways: 
(1) by granting the low-income neighborhood in which the 
siting will occur a countervailing set of valuable rights over 
the landfill’s operation, priority for jobs at the landfill, 
priority for local redevelopment efforts, and so on; or (2) a 
tax-and-transfer system could redistribute to low-income 
people to make up for the fact that efficient land use 
decisions will often disadvantage them distributively.  
 
Under the first approach, the role of “landfill host” would comprise a 
unified package of benefits and detriments—and the benefits may be of 
sufficient magnitude to cause competition over which neighborhood will get 
to host the landfill. This bundling of benefits with detriments involves some 
inefficiencies, including the possibility that the benefits will be less valuable 
to recipients than the cash equivalent would be. Low-income households 
may also be imperfectly targeted by the assistance. But the bundling avoids 
the need for a second, and overtly redistributive, step. The second approach 
allows the efficient, uncompensated siting to go forward, thus generating a 
new baseline in which low-income people have suffered this disadvantage 
(along with many others wrought by efficient legal rules). There is no way 
to address this distributive result through tax without causing some people 
to suffer a loss from the new baseline—something that will be coded as a 
stand-alone loss, and heavily resisted as such.  
Even within the domain of taxes, political action costs can vary. A 
growing literature on tax salience examines how both political and market 
responses can vary depending on the degree of attention a particular tax 
attracts.116 Taxes that can be made lower-salience, as through paycheck 
withholding or bundling with mortgage payments, may carry lower political 
action costs.117 Bundling redistribution with various forms of social 
                                                 
115 See Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got To Do With It?; Cf. Adler & Posner at 143-44 (providing an 
example involving the converse case of siting a park that would increase property values, potentially spurring the 
rich to move in and the poor to move out).   
116 See e.g, Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 Am. 
Econ. Rev.1145 (2009); David Gamage and Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and 
Political Salience, 65 Tax L. Rev. 19 (2011); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing 
Taxes, 28 Yale J. on Reg. 253 (2011); Andrew T. Hayashi, The Legal Salience of Taxation (2012), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2151867; Jacob Goldin, Optimal Tax Salience (2014), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009108.  
117 E.g. Hayashi on property taxes; see also [news article on no one noticing increase in payroll tax].  
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insurance, so that the loss is packaged with a potential future benefit, can 
also make the redistributive element less evident and hence less heavily 
resisted. All of these manipulations raise normative questions, as we discuss 
below.118 Regardless of where one comes out on the normative issues, 
however, the very fact that there is often heated debate over how painful 
and apparent redistribution should be suggests that political results can vary 
with a program’s framing. If this were not the case, then nothing would turn 
on decisions that implicate tax salience. 
Other work finds that people will assess the fairness of a tax differently 
based on details like whether the tax rates are expressed in dollars or 
percentages and whether the tax system is bifurcated into separate pieces or 
unified.119 It is well recognized that penalties and subsidies are often viewed 
differently, despite their identical economic impact. A standard example 
illustrating this point is the different reactions to a child subsidy provided to 
households versus a childlessness tax imposed on households. Nearly all 
respondents think that a child subsidy should be larger for low-income 
families. But when the frame is flipped and the measure is recast as a tax on 
childlessness, few respondents think that low-income households should be 
taxed more heavily for not bearing children.120 More broadly, tax 
deductions are viewed quite differently from direct government grants, 
despite their identical economic substance.121  
The cognitive literature thus establishes that people respond differently 
to measures that have identical incidence depending on how the measures 
are presented. This variance in responses in experimental settings tracks the 
variance in political responses that presumably underlies all manner of 
rhetorical and policy choices.122 The cognitive variance supported by 
existing work strongly undermines the claim of distributive invariance. If 
economically equivalent measures can morph from acceptable to 
unacceptable or vice versa due to substantively irrelevant features, we 
should not expect that the political action costs associated with enacting 
different measures will be invariant. And if political action costs are not 
invariant across different methods and formulations of redistribution, then it 
follows that the amount of redistribution that can be accomplished through 
                                                 
118 [cross reference] 
119 McCaffery & Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L Rev 1745 (2005).  
120 The example is from Schelling, and the reversal is known as the Schelling effect. Schelling, T. C. (1981). 
Economic reasoning and the ethics of policy. Public Interest, 63, 37–61. More recent experiments by McCaffery 
& Baron showing same effect.  
121 For example, Justin Wolfers asked how many people would support the home mortgage deduction if it 
were framed as an “explicit government handout” that benefits those in the top 1% about 30 times more than 
average income households. http://freakonomics.com/2012/04/17/tax-deductions-or-tax-expenditures/ 
122 For example, the strategic characterization of the estate tax as a “death tax” by its opponents has been 
credited with catalyzing its widespread political unpopularity (which seemed objectively puzzling, given its 
extraordinarily narrow targeting). See, e.g., Steven M. Sheffrin, Tax Fairness and Folk Justice 144 (2013) (“The 
conservative leadership sculpted the estate tax’s image; they labeled it the ‘death tax’ to influence the public to 
confront it as an ominous, universal problem.”). 
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different methods and formulations would also vary.  
One objection might be that for any optimally framed and presented 
non-tax legal rule or public policy, there is a superior optimally framed and 
presented tax-and-transfer mechanism. It is not clear this is the case, 
however. An especially interesting finding in the experimental literature to 
date is the extra aversion that people attach to charges that are labeled as 
taxes.123  Moreover, when a salary is stated in pre-tax terms, the difference 
between this amount and what the employee gets to keep inevitably appears 
as a loss.  To the extent that loss aversion or an endowment effect makes 
losing things that one already has more painful that not receiving things that 
one never had, tax-and-transfer may be categorically more cognitively 
painful than alternative approaches that channel entitlements to the less well 
off in the first instance or that structure allocation systems to produce less 
salient cross-subsidies.124 Yet even establishing that framing and other 
cognitive manipulations should be taken into account by welfarists within 
the broad category of tax-and-transfer would move the conversation 
forward from its present position by establishing that political action costs 
are positive and that they can vary depending on program design.  
 
C.  Fairness Preferences 
 
K&S have famously argued that fairness (which they take to include any 
non-welfare value, such as morality, justice, or dignity) has no value apart 
from its effect on welfare.125 We will not quarrel with this proposition, but 
we believe that taking seriously the proviso “apart from its effect on 
welfare” seriously undermines the point and creates another reason to reject 
distributive invariance. Of particular relevance to the present discussion is 
the capacity for a policy or rule’s alignment with fairness intuitions to 
reduce the political action costs associated with its adoption, or to raise the 
political action costs that would be associated with counteracting it through 
some other political means.  
 
1. Fairness Preferences as Inputs to Political Action Costs 
 
Individuals typically possess a variety of beliefs and preferences about 
what is “fair” or “unfair” in particular contexts. They frequently think of 
justice in a local, micro-setting, such as fairness among neighbors or co-
                                                 
123 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 Psych. Pub. Pol’y & L. 106, 
117-19 (2006) (describing these findings). See also Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Framing and 
taxation: Evaluation of tax policies involving household composition, 25 J. Econ. Psych. 679–705 (2004). 
124 This point also connects to our discussion in the next section, which examines how perceptions of 
fairness interact with political palatability.  
125 The thrust of their view is encapsulated in the title they chose for their book exploring this point, Fairness 
versus Welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note __.   
1-Jan-15] DISTRIBUTIVE DEFICIT 35 
workers, rather than only what is fair in a global sense.126 Put in terms of 
our critique of the invariance hypothesis, more redistribution might be done 
(or the same amount might be done more cheaply) through methods 
perceived as fair than through methods perceived as unfair.127 If the degree 
to which a particular redistributive effort resonates with fairness preferences 
bears on how cheaply, effectively, and durably it can be carried out, then the 
study of fairness becomes an important input into welfare maximization 
efforts that depend on achieving particular distributive outcomes.  
This point is subtly different from the one K&S and other law and 
economics scholars make when they recognize that people may have 
preferences for fairness, and that satisfying those preferences, like satisfying 
any other preference, can increase welfare directly (that is, people are made 
better off by directly experiencing and observing fairness). This is certainly 
true, and on its own may be extremely important, given that some 
preferences for fairness can only be satisfied within particular legal 
contexts.128  
We would add to this point a second way in which fairness preferences 
operate: by reducing political action costs associated with redistributive 
measures. Instead of just positing that citizens “consume” fairness by 
observing or experiencing it, this argument contemplates an instrumental 
role for fairness in pursuing welfare. Using fairness criteria to select and 
formulate redistributive legal rules could ease the political path for those 
rules. Moving a certain number of dollars from one income class to another 
might generate less political resistance when done by a substantive  legal 
rule that is popularly perceived as fair than by a tax-and-transfer system that 
is widely viewed as unfair.129 Compare, for example, living wage legislation 
or housing supports that enable workers to live in the communities in which 
they are employed with a tax-and-transfer program that draws from and 
benefits the same income classes.130 The public might perceive in the latter 
                                                 
126 See Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens (1993); H. 
Peyton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice (1995); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, 
Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 Amer. Econ. Rev. 728 (1986). 
127 Our concern here is with perceptions of fairness, which are subject to a variety of manipulations through 
policy design, not with making any statements about what is or is not fair in some deontological sense.  
128 For example, certain procedural protections that have distributive implications may satisfy a sense of 
fairness even if they are known to produce some inefficiencies. Yet these must, by their very nature, be provided 
in kind—that is, in the form of an inefficient procedural rule. [cites] [Cf. racial profiling discussion in Blumkin & 
Margalioth]. Consider due process protections afforded to public benefit recipients prior to termination. These 
protections might satisfy fairness preferences even if they reduced the effectiveness of the targeting of assistance 
(by keeping some ineligible people on the rolls longer). Fairness preferences could provide a reason sounding in 
welfare for using the procedure despite its inefficiency, solely based on the consumption preferences of people 
participating in or observing the way that the public benefits system operates. 
129 This follows from the fact that monetary outcomes are not the sole determinants of people’s evaluations.  
See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Taking Outcomes Seriously, 2012 Utah L. Rev. 861..   
130 This comparison assumes that the legislation in question would actually benefit the target income class, 
notwithstanding any supply effects or contracting-around that might occur. Although the empirical questions are 
complex, there is some evidence that minimum wage laws, for example, can have a net redistributive effect. See 
Liscow, supra note 2, at 2498 n.46 (reviewing research on this point). Regardless of whether one agrees with these 
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case but not the former that we are taking away money from people who 
have “earned it,” and giving it to others who have not.131   
If common attitudes about deservingness or desert apply differently for 
substantive legal rules than for the tax system, then the political costs of 
redistribution through these mechanisms will be asymmetric as well. 
Resistance to overt redistribution of income is often fueled by the belief that 
the market system reliably delivers distributionally fair outcomes to 
individuals, and that, therefore, any shortfalls in outcomes can be readily 
connected to personal shortfalls of character or effort.132 Those who benefit 
from the system may easily overlook the ways in which it fails to meet this 
model.133 Institutional changes to the “rules of the game” that generate 
market results may have a more powerful and stickier effect on distributive 
results if they are understood to be part of an essentially fair process for 
producing outcomes. Not only are these changes more likely to be accepted 
in the first instance than a change that moves money around after the fact in 
a separate step, they are less likely to be counteracted.  
Just as payments for different reasons are not viewed as fungible with 
each other, so too may the amount of assistance realistically available 
depend on the form that it takes and the restrictions that it implicitly or 
explicitly places on recipients. Consider, for example, the debate about 
whether assistance to poor people should be provided through an 
unrestricted cash grant or rather in kind, through food stamps, housing 
vouchers, and so on. The economic case for the unrestricted cash grant is 
clear—it can be expected to do a better job of advancing the welfare of 
recipients because they can spend on whatever they value most. But in-kind 
provision of assistance is ubiquitous, and it seems extraordinarily unlikely 
that the political will would exist to replace all such programs with their 
cash equivalents.134 One reason might be that people view those who are 
less well off as having only a moral claim on certain kinds of resources that 
better their condition in certain well-defined ways.135 Changing the form 
                                                                                                                            
specific examples, as long as the universe of rules that both resonate with fairness preferences and manage to 
redistribute in a preferred direction is not a null set, the reasoning in the text holds.   
131 See, e.g., Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel The Myth of Ownership, supra note __ at 35 (‘If people 
intuitively feel that they are in an absolute sense morally entitled to their net incomes, it is not surprising that 
politicians can get away with describing tax increases (which diminish net income) as taking from the people what 
belongs to them.’); Tsachi Keren-Paz, Torts, Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice 49 (2007) (arguing that “a 
transfer payment is more likely to submit the poor to attacks that they are lazy, unproductive, and a burden on 
hard-working taxpayers” than a change in tort compensation rules that is understood as “a manifestation of the 
substantive notion of equality before the law according to which it is unacceptable to systematically expose the 
poor to higher risks”).  
132 See Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice 73-74 (1976) 
(expressing ambivalence about “whether without such partly erroneous beliefs [in the deservingness of wealth] the 
large numbers will tolerate actual differences in rewards which will be based on partly on achievement and partly 
on mere chance.”).  
133 [Babcock et al. on self serving bias; for systems justification bias, see Sheffrin, at 49-53].   
134 See generally Steven Kelman, A Case for In-Kind Transfers, 2 Econ. & Phil. 55, 57 (1986). 
135 See id. at 62 (“It is from the right to life and the right to be spared from living in degrading circumstances 
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may remove the rationale.136  
Similarly, redistribution prompted by discrete misfortunes that were 
plainly out of the control of the victim will garner more political support 
than redistribution prompted by chronic need or an abstract concern with 
the state of the Gini coefficient.137 An obvious example is disaster relief.  
Although such relief presents well-known moral hazard concerns,138 it may 
also achieve increments of redistribution that are unlikely to be replicated 
through (or undone by) tax-and-transfer.   
 
2. Punishment Preferences 
 
Fairness preferences include preferences for the punishment of 
wrongdoers, what an experimental literature calls “altruistic punishment.”139 
Humans are willing to incur costs to make sure that the punishment of 
wrongdoers occurs even when it can create no possible strategic gain for the 
individual, other than satisfying the revealed preference for punishment. 
Indeed, people are willing to incur these costs even when they were not the 
victim of the transgression. Thus, fairness demands that people who 
wrongly gain at the expense of others should suffer a loss. 
We will go a step further than the experiments and conjecture that if 
people will pay to punish (real or perceived) wrongdoing, despite the fact 
that it will not improve their payoffs, they would also incur costs to prevent 
                                                                                                                            
that justifications for rights to health care and to a minimum standard of living can be developed.”). There are 
other possible explanations too, from pure paternalism to a desire to protect children who cannot control their 
parents’ purchasing decision, to a desire to make the receipt of welfare as unpleasant and demeaning as possible 
so as to limit resort to it by anyone who has other options. These too can be cast under the rubric of (someone’s 
idea of) fairness. Again, our goal is not to defend any particular vision of fairness but rather to show that these 
perceptions represent inputs into political costs, and hence into distributive outcomes.  
136 See Kelman, supra note 134 at 63 (“[W]hat would be the impact of a decision to move from provision of 
health care or food stamps to a provision of their cash equivalent? Simply put, such a decision would destroy the 
justification for the policy in the first place.” 
137 Id. at 69 (observing that preferences for helping disadvantaged people are sensitive to “the context in 
which the issue is presented” and that “presenting the problem of the disadvantaged in a multiplicity of contexts, 
tied to specific problems they face, will tend to increase the willingness of the non-disadvantaged to help, 
compared to a situation where the problem is presented in a single abstract context.”). See also Hylland and 
Zeckhauser, supra note 61, at 282. 
138 See, e.g., Kaplow, Louis. "Incentives and Government Relief for Risk," 4 Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 167 (1991); Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, J. Contemp. Legal Issues 13 
J. Contemp. Legal Issues 161, 172. (2003). Interestingly, the rhetoric of disaster was used during the Depression 
to galvanize support for social insurance.  See Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and “Natural” Disaster 
Relief: Narrating the American Welfare State, 33 Law & Soc. Rev. 257 (1999).    
139 See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, “Human Altruism – Proximate Patterns and Evolutionary Origins,” 
27 Analyse & Kritik 6, 8 (2005) (“The ultimatum game (UG) (Guth et al. 1982) nicely illustrates that a sizeable 
number of people from a wide variety of cultures (Henrich et al. 2001; Roth et al. 1991) facing high monetary 
stakes (Cameron 1999; Hoffman et al. 1996; Slonim/Roth 1998) are willing to hurt others to . . . punish unfair 
behaviour.”). Newer experiments confirm this result when the potential punisher was not himself a victim of the 
wrongdoing. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, “Third-party Punishment and Social Norms,” 25 Evolution & 
Human Behav. 63–87 (2004); Joseph Henrich, et al. “Costly Punishment Across Human Societies,” 312 Science 
1767 (2006). See also Dominique J.-F. de Quervain, et al., “The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment,” 305 
Science 1254 (2004) (reporting that neural images of subjects undergoing a punishment experiment reveal that 
effective punishment of norm violators activates a reward center in the brain). 
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the wrongdoing, even if it will not improve their payoffs.140 That premise 
reveals another way that the mode of distribution affects the quantity of 
distribution: People might choose to bear the cost of living in a world with 
suboptimal (in their view) levels of redistribution in order to avoid a 
particularly despised form of redistributive leakage—that in favor of a 
recipient who might try to cheat the system.  
Imagine a taxpayer choosing between two redistributive policies: policy 
A, which takes the form of a tax-and-transfer program, and policy B, which 
is a redistributive legal rule. Both schemes have “leakage” that takes the 
form of distributing income towards the wrong people—the non-poor, say, 
when the appropriate targets are only the poor. In equilibrium, policy A mis-
targets to one person out of 100 per time period and appropriately provides 
assistance to the other 99 targets. In equilibrium, policy B mis-targets to ten 
people out of 100 per time period and appropriately provides the same level 
of assistance to the other 90 targets. It would seem that policy A strictly 
dominates policy B. But suppose that for A the one inappropriate recipient is 
a cheat, someone who makes himself eligible by fraud, and it is impossible 
(given the costs) to eliminate the 1% fraud. For policy B, the wrong targets 
are not cheats; they are the passive beneficiaries of an inefficient legal rule 
or program that haphazardly distributes in the wrong direction 10% of the 
time.  
Anyone might still regard policy B as superior if the susceptibility of 
policy A to intentional wrongdoing means that the cheating rate would or 
might increase over time. But let us suppose that these numbers represent 
deterrent equilibria with a steady state leakage rates of 1% and 10%, 
respectively. Without punitive preferences, it is now obvious that citizens 
would pick policy A over policy B. With punitive preferences, however, 
they might anticipate more disutility from policy A if they know that 
unpunished and effectively unpunishable wrongdoers will exploit it, and 
therefore prefer policy B.141 Indeed, if we consider the welfare losses to 
citizens with these punitive preferences, policy A’s redistribution might 
represent a net loss in welfare, even though it would represent a net gain if 
these preferences did not exist. As a result, voters who are unwilling to 
adopt policy A may be willing to adopt policy B. It may, therefore, be 
possible to redistribute more through policy B than through policy A.   
By offering this example, we do not mean to argue that tax-and-transfer 
is always or inherently more prone to cheating (or perceived cheating) than 
                                                 
140 [Cf. experimental work where people will incur costs or forgo gains to avoid the risk of being suckered] 
141 A closely related point is that equivalent behavioral distortions may generate differential amounts of 
disutility among those observing the distortion. Thus, even if we accept the argument that legal rules distort the 
labor-leisure choice just as much as direct transfers, observing recipients electing leisure over labor may produce 
far more outrage among nonrecipients when the transfers are provided on a stand-alone basis, rather than as an 
accompaniment to, say, a tort judgment following an injury.  
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redistributive legal rules. Legal rules can also be abused by wrongdoing 
claimants. Our only point is that there is no reason to assume that the 
political costs associated with cheating are exactly equal across all policies, 
nor that they always favor the mechanism of tax-and-transfer. In at least 
some contexts, the more efficient form of redistribution, judged by the total 
quantity of leakage, may also be more politically objectionable due to the 
quality of that leakage. If one form of distribution offends fairness 
preferences more, there may still be room for more of the distribution that 
offends them less.  
 
3. Fair Bundles 
 
This discussion has mostly focused on the role of fairness perceptions in 
constructing the preferences that are inputs into political action—the 
“decision-influencing” phase of political action costs. But fairness 
considerations can also reduce the search or “opportunity spotting” phase as 
well. Interactions in which low-income individuals have been wronged or 
disadvantaged by others present natural opportunities to address distribution 
in a manner consonant with fairness intuitions. Offering transfer payments 
for a defensible reason sounding in fairness (e.g., corrective justice) is 
politically different, and (we argue) easier, than offering transfer payments 
for no reason other than a net gain in social welfare.142  
Recall the Landfill example, where one option is to tie the siting of a 
landfill with benefits that go to the neighborhood where the landfill is 
placed. We introduced the example to describe the importance of framing, 
but it may also work because voters more readily perceive the 
compensatory bundle as fair than they would perceive a general system of 
tax-and-transfer that might have the same distributive result for the 
neighborhood. The same logic lies behind Trade Adjustment Assistance 
programs, where Congress attempts to set up job training programs and 
other benefits targeted to the individuals who lose employment as a result of 
a free trade agreement.143 One could again rely on a general system of tax-
and-transfer, but the public is likely to perceive the redistribution as more 
fair when paired with a specific burden. Our point is not that a 
deontological theory of corrective justice justifies the distributive benefit (it 
may or may not), but rather that the public perception of corrective justice 
eases the political path for providing that benefit. 
This general point is even more apparent if we shift to a context where 
there is no direct analogue to a centralized tax-and-transfer mechanism. 
                                                 
142 Lewinsohn-Zamir. 
143 See Eleanor Roberts Lewis and Harry J. Connolly, Jr., Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms and 
Industries, 10 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 579 (1988); Frank H. Morgan and Helen Wong, Trade Adjustment Assistance 
Cases: 2007 Developments, 40 Geo. J. Int'l L. 99 (2008).  
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Consider, for example, the question of how the burdens of carbon reduction 
should be allocated among countries, given that some developed earlier than 
others and some are wealthier than others. In a recent book, Eric Posner and 
David Weisbach argue that the desire to help poor countries (which they 
endorse) should be kept conceptually separate from questions of what to do 
about carbon reduction.144 Although they view it as an empirical question 
whether a climate change treaty could turn out to be a valid redistributive 
vehicle,145 they make clear that any such redistributive approach must prove 
its merits as a redistributive vehicle when compared against other possible 
redistributive methods.146    
But other possible redistributive methods remain nothing more than 
theoretical abstractions until they are reduced to real-world mechanisms that 
are under the control of some decisionmaker with the authority and desire to 
actually make the transfer.147 Setting up such a redistributive channel 
involves large political action costs. Finding a decisionmaker with both the 
power and the preferences to get the job done is made all the more difficult 
if the job in question is defined as a stand-alone act of redistribution 
(essentially, an act of charity), rather than representing elements of 
something else—like ability-to-pay adjusted contributions to a common 
goal, or a squaring-up of past injustices. If decisionmakers are already 
coming together to create a treaty aimed at substantive objectives, 
especially ones that have significant distributive implications, then the 
ready-made channel this provides for carrying out distributive objectives 
should be explored, not rejected out of hand until it can prove its superiority 
to all other potential methods of redistribution.  
In sum, the costs of finding an appropriate mechanism for 
accomplishing redistribution argues for bundling together rather than 
separating distributive goals and other substantive goals, especially where 
doing so will enable the leveraging of fairness intuitions to support the 
distributive move (whether or not those intuitions would survive 
philosophical scrutiny). Here, as elsewhere, any savings on political action 
costs and uniquely achievable distributive gains must be weighed against 
                                                 
144 Climate Change Justice at 73 (arguing that any claim wealthy countries should bear a larger responsibility 
“improperly tie valid concerns about redistribution to the problem of reducing the effects of climate change”).  
145 Although they personally favor pursuing the two goals on “separate track[s],” id at 192, they view it as 
“conceivable (but unlikely) that a climate treaty could turn out to be a good way to redistribute wealth,” id. at 117, 
and specify the empirical showings that would be required to support such an approach. See id. at 75, 80-96, 176-
78. Separately, they reject a corrective justice rationale for burdening the developed countries more heavily. See 
id. at 99-118.  
146 This point is further emphasized in recent independent work by David Weisbach. [WIP paper on “climate 
change blinders” (arguing that redistribution has been wrongly brought into climate change discussions based on 
the unproven assumption that it dominates other, and presumptively better, ways to redistribute)] 
147 Adler and Posner recognize just this point in their work on cost-benefit analysis. See Adler & Posner, 
supra note 15, at 144 (observing that even though it might be better to pair an efficient siting decision with a 
transfer payment, “[w]e know of no agency in the U.S. government that has the authority to order wealth transfers, 
and there are many good reasons for denying agencies this authority.”). 
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efficiency losses that may come from using a particular redistributive 
vehicle. But attention to political action costs offers reasons for investing in 
making the calculation.  
 
4. A Note About Domain 
 
A possible objection to our focus on the role of fairness in constructing 
political action costs is that we have shifted our attention outside of the 
proper domain of “redistribution” in which tax superiority holds. K&S 
explicitly state that they are limiting their discussion to “the overall 
distribution of income or wealth, not entitlement to payment based on 
desert.”148 Perhaps one would say that if there is a strong public view about 
the fairness of a particular legal rule or distribution, that we are no longer in 
the domain to which simple income redistribution applies. 
Yet there is no way to cleanly separate income distribution from matters 
of individual desert. Consider first a legal rule that might seem to sit clearly 
outside of the domain of redistribution:  a ban on racial discrimination in 
employment. The desert-based justification for protecting individuals from 
discrimination does not explain why civil rights laws forbid only some 
parties to discriminate and not others: employers but not employees;149 
public accommodations but not customers;150 landlords but not 
homeseekers.151  There are many reasons why we might see these patterns, 
but one possibility might be to beat back forms of discrimination that are 
especially damaging to one’s income or wealth. If so, we might understand 
bans on racial discrimination (and discrimination on other protected 
grounds) as non-tax rules that in fact address important sources of income 
inequality. Yet because these laws align with the public preference against 
the unfairness of discrimination, they are more politically feasible than 
achieving the same result via tax-and-transfer.152  
On the other end of the spectrum, programs that seem clearly 
redistributive, like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), food stamps, and 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), involve a strong 
element of desert. Consider the work requirements that helped make TANF 
and the EITC politically acceptable and the exclusion of felony drug 
                                                 
148 K&S 1994 at 667 n.1. 
149 [cite] 
150 Public accommodations are prohibited from discriminating against customers on the basis of race, but 
customers are not banned from discriminating on the basis of race against the owners or managers of public 
accommodations. See Michael Blake, The Discriminating Shopper, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 1017 (2006); Katharine 
T. Bartlett and G. Mitu Gulati, Why Do We Allow Customer Discrimination? (2014) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540334. 
151 [Fair Housing Act; Bellwood case] 
152 Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note __, at 14-18 (arguing that doctrinal bans on private race discrimination 
address distributional issues better than race-sensitive taxes); id. at 18-21 (arguing that doctrinal bans on racial 
profiling by police address distributional issues more cheaply than tax). 
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offenders from the food stamp program.153 If “entitlement[s] to payment 
based on desert” can be understood broadly enough to reach even the actual 
welfare programs that exist in the world, then virtually no redistributive 
legal rules would fall within the distributive domain. One could then 
concede the principle of tax superiority but avoid it in every case of interest. 
This is plainly not what proponents of tax superiority have in mind. 
Indeed, K&S themselves appear to contemplate the domain of tax 
superiority as reaching into areas like tort and contract law to preclude 
distribution-sensitive divergences from efficiency,154 even though those 
fields also embed desert-based notions.  Yet K&S presumably would not 
want to replace every law’s distributive feature with tax-and-transfer. 
Antidiscrimination law provides an especially compelling example,155 but 
similar points might be made about, say, compensation requirements in tort 
and property that have distributive effects even as they respond to 
wrongs.156 
To be sure, cabining off certain domains as too desert-infused to count 
as redistribution might help to prop up the invariance hypothesis (through 
the simple expedient of removing from the analysis a set of distributive 
changes that we would not expect to see replicated or countered through tax 
law). But if welfare is the goal, all distributive changes count, whether 
delivered through nominally redistributive measures or otherwise.  Here, as 
elsewhere, the presence of positive political action costs introduces the 
possibility that one redistributive route will be more successful than 
another, producing distributive variance. 
 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF POSITIVE POLITICAL ACTION COSTS 
 
 Positive political action costs, like positive transaction costs, 
radically change the operating environment for maximizing welfare. Just as 
                                                 
153 See 21 U.S.C. 862a (making those convicted of certain drug felonies ineligible for various forms of 
assistance, including nutritional assistance, subject to state opt-outs); [case law upholding].    
154 See Markovits, supra note 5, at __ (noting this point).  
155 Economics does not have a clear agreement on the normative justification for the ban on race 
discrimination. Richard Epstein famously argued against the prohibition on race discrimination in employment, 
partly from an economic perspective. See Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment 
Discrimination Law (1995). For efforts to justify such laws within economics, see John J. Donohue III, Advocacy 
versus Analysis, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1583 (1992) (reviewing Epstein’s book); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation 
and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003 
(1995).  
156 The response might be that these other laws have an impetus other than altering distribution; they are 
responding to a wrong first and foremost, and only incidentally affecting distribution. But on further examination, 
many compensation requirements (like those associated with the takings clause, or with having tortfeasors 
compensate victims) can be recast as forms of social insurance. [cites to insurance function of tort and to 
insurance characterization of the takings clause]. Redistribution is of course often cast in exactly these terms as 
well. See, e.g., Dworkin. Conversely, many redistributive measures are prompted not by income statistics or Gini 
coefficients but by discrete events that have unfairly impacted their victims—if not “wrongs” as such, then at least 
identifiable misfortunes.  See Landis, supra note 138.    
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positive transaction costs introduce the possibility of divergence between 
the existing allocation of resources and the efficient allocation, positive 
political action costs introduce the possibility of divergence between the 
existing distributive results and those that would maximize welfare.157 This 
possibility follows as a matter of logic from the fact that different 
distributive results are possible depending on how redistribution is carried 
out—that is, from the failure of the invariance hypothesis. And, 
importantly, the point holds regardless of whether one believes that current 
levels of redistribution undershoot or overshoot the welfare-maximizing 
level. By analogy, one need not take a stand on whether polluting factories 
or polluted-upon homeowners should receive more or fewer entitlements in 
the world in order to believe that transaction costs can interfere with 
efficiency. Our point is equally fundamental: In the presence of positive 
political action costs, we cannot wave away the possibility that our political 
system will fail to achieve welfare-maximizing distributive results.158  
  In this Part, we first examine the parallel between political action 
costs and transaction costs. Second, we explore the case for doctrinal 
redistribution. In these two sections we raise and respond to some possible 
objections to our analysis. In the third section, we offer some directions for 
future research into political actions costs.    
 
A.   The Problem of Political Action Costs 
 
 We can begin, in Coasean fashion, by examining the sort of 
invariant distributive results we would get if political action costs were 
zero. In this world, it matters not at all how legal rules and institutional 
arrangements affect distribution, because a costless redistributive 
                                                 
157 Of course, different actors and entities will have different views about what constitutes distributive 
optimality. For concreteness, and not by way of limitation, it may be helpful to think of society possessing a social 
welfare function that tracks the distributive preferences of the median voter or citizen. For some suggestive 
evidence of divergences between actual distributions, perceived distributions, and preferred distributions, see, e.g., 
Sorapop Kiatponsan & Michael Norton, How Much (More) Should CEOs Make? A Universal Desire for More 
Equal Pay, Persp. Psych. Sci. (forthcoming) (working paper 2014 on file with authors) (using survey data from 40 
countries to trace misperceptions about CEO pay versus average worker pay, and finding divergence among 
actual, perceived, and “ideal pay” for CEOs); Michael I. Norton & Dan Ariely, Building a Better America—One 
Wealth Quintile at a Time, 6 Persp. Psych. Sci. 9 (2011) (finding in nationally representative online panel that 
people perceived wealth distribution as far more equal than it actually is, and desired wealth distributions that 
were even more equitable than these erroneous estimates). Welfare maximization might also be assessed based on 
a social welfare function derived from exogenously selected principles. Our point here is very general: for any 
given social welfare function, there may be a divergence between the distribution that would maximize welfare 
and the distribution the political system actually produces.   
158 The analogy we draw between the Coase Theorem and the problem of political action costs is not original 
to us. See Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics, 31 
J. Comp. Econ. 620 (2003). Acemoglu argues that societies pursue inefficient policies due to certain kinds of 
transaction costs that operate in the political realm, including the inability to bind future decisionmakers. These 
costs explain why a society capable of achieving redistribution in a less efficient way could not simply bargain to 
have that same increment of redistribution handled through the tax system. See David Weisbach, Distributionally-
Weighted CBA, 2014 at 38 (asking why this result would not hold).  
44 Fennell & McAdams [1-Jan-15 
mechanism will instantly and perfectly correct any distributive infelicities. 
No one concerned with distribution would have any incentive to attempt to 
accomplish distributive goals through means other than the costless tax-and-
transfer system, for all the reasons that K&S and others have detailed. First, 
it would introduce distortions, and second, it would be ineffective in 
changing the distributive picture because of a costless adjustment by 
Congress (or whatever fanciful body would make decisions in a world of 
zero political action costs).  
Indeed, a very useful way of reading K&S’s contribution is as a purely 
conceptual demonstration analogous to that undertaken by Coase: for any 
quantum of redistribution that might be accomplished through legal rules, 
there exists (in theory) a tax-and-transfer method that would be superior.159 
This is analogous to saying that for any quantum of government coercion 
that might be used to place resources in the hands of higher valuer, there 
exists (in theory) a private bargain that would be a better way to accomplish 
that shift. Just as we do not derive from the Coase Theorem a general 
principle of “transaction superiority” (given transaction costs), we cannot 
derive from K&S’s demonstration any general principle of “tax superiority” 
(given political action costs). Instead, Coase’s work was designed to focus 
attention on the existence of transaction costs.160 The K&S demonstration 
should likewise turn our attention to political action costs, not divert 
attention away from them with conjectures and assumptions.   
  
 
1. Beyond Tautology 
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to first consider an argument that 
might seem to rehabilitate the invariance hypothesis: Even if political action 
costs are positive, they can never interfere with the maximization of social 
welfare under society’s currently-existing social welfare function. 
According to this argument, the costs of political action are part of the 
                                                 
159 K&S have been read in this way. See Christopher Curran, Optimal Techniques of Redistribution in 
Bibliography of Law and Economics, Volume IV 301, 309 (edited by Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, 
2000) (describing the work of K&S and others as “comprising an ‘existence theorem - if society decides to 
redistribute income, there exists a tax schedule for redistributing income that everyone prefers to any other way of 
redistributing income, including the use of legal rules or institutions.”). Some aspects of their joint work supports 
this reading.  See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 19, at 669 (“[A]ny regime with an inefficient legal 
rule can be replaced by a regime with an efficient legal rule and a modified income tax system designed so every 
person is made better off.”) (emphasis in original).  In addition, in later solo work, Kaplow has expressly 
characterized an analysis of externality control that employs the premise of distributive neutrality as a theoretical 
exercise rather than a basis for policy.  See Kaplow, Externalities, supra note 72, at 489, 503.   
160 See R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 13-16 (1988) (explaining that he “examined what 
would happen in a world in which transaction costs were assumed to be zero . . . . not to describe what life would 
be like in such a world, but to provide a simple setting in which to develop the analysis, and, what was even more 
important, to make clear the fundamental role which transaction costs do, and should, play in the fashioning of the 
institutions which make up the economic system”).    
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background conditions that produce the political equilibrium that in turn 
produces the social welfare function that society is maximizing. There is 
therefore never any daylight between the welfare-maximizing distribution 
and the actual distribution because the actual distribution is the product of 
welfare-maximizing actions under the existing political constraints.  
Suppose, for example, that distributive patterns become vastly less 
egalitarian following changes in earning patterns that are not counteracted 
to any significant degree by changes in the tax system.161 This distributive 
result can be interpreted not as the product of a political impediment to the 
achievement of some stable preexisting social welfare function, but rather 
as a perfect instantiation of the new social welfare function generated by the 
new political equilibrium produced by these new earning patterns. So 
whatever the distribution was in 1990 was just the distribution that political 
equilibrium allowed. Whatever the distribution is in 2014 is just what the 
political equilibrium allows.     
Not only is this argument nonfalsifiable as an empirical matter, it 
appears logically unassailable: If we define the social welfare function as 
being maximized by the distributive pattern that the political system 
actually produces under each given set of conditions, then we need never 
worry about distributive results not maximizing welfare. They always will, 
simply because we have decided to define what it means to “maximize 
welfare” as whatever the system produces. The fact that different 
distributive results can in fact follow from different methods of 
redistributing presents no obstacle to this line of reasoning, since whichever 
method of redistribution is actually selected can be understood to have itself 
altered the overall political equilibrium and with it society’s social welfare 
function.162  
Of course, accepting this tautology means choosing to ignore 
distributive considerations, without quite saying one is doing so.163  This, 
we think, is an insupportable position for a welfarist to take. Confronting 
distributive variance admittedly introduces many complications. Because 
law and economics scholars are usually gesturing at some as-yet-
unspecified social welfare function which maps to our current distributive 
pattern in unknown or contested ways, it may be unclear whether more or 
less redistribution is called for to maximize welfare. Once we have a social 
welfare function in view, we quickly confront knotty problems like trying to 
determine the rate at which the marginal utility of money diminishes, and 
                                                 
161 [Young, Equity, at p.114: table 6.2 shows remarkable stability in effective income tax rates over time.]  
162 We do not dispute that redistributive efforts can have the effect of altering the political equilibrium. See 
Markovits, supra note 5 at 600-01; McDonnell supra note 5 at 111. What we are questioning is whether any 
realistic social welfare function can be understood to be satisfied regardless of which political equilibrium obtains 
and which distributive outcome is produced.  
163 Cf. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality,22 J .L. & ECON.141 (1979) (addressing a similar 
tautology involving transaction costs).   
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how or whether we can make interpersonal utility comparisons.  
The invariance hypothesis, if true, would make such inquiries 
unnecessary. Comparing the welfare generated by two (or more) different 
distributive results is obviously a much less tractable task than simply 
examining which of two routes to an invariant distributive result is less 
costly. Yet because invariance cannot be made true without resort to 
tautology, it cannot be invoked to push distributive considerations out of the 
welfarist analysis of legal rules and policies. Law and economics scholars 
should not, of course, feel compelled to take up distributive questions if 
they would prefer to focus solely on questions of economic efficiency. But 
they should be clear about what they are—and are not—doing.  
 
2. Communicating and Collaborating 
 
Consistent with the discussion above, we propose a change in the way 
that law and economics speaks to those who care about distribution and 
who believe that our current distributive pattern diverges from what would 
maximize welfare. Currently the standard message transmitted from law 
and economics is this: 
 
Standard Message. You care about distribution? Hey, we care 
about distribution too! We’re welfarists and we get it; you don’t 
have to convince us. Hugely important thing, distribution. But 
you’re going about this business of redistribution all wrong. You 
think you’re helping the poor by making legal rules that are sensitive 
to distribution? Not so. You’re just screwing up everything by 
making legal rules inefficient. There is a better way. Tax-and-
transfer will get you to your distributive goal (whatever it may be) 
more cheaply than whatever plan you have in mind. The pie can be 
bigger, and everyone can have a bigger slice. 
 
Standard Message sounds ecumenical and open to all distributive 
approaches. But, as we have seen, it is only possible to defend the 
invariance hypothesis upon which it is implicitly based by adopting a vision 
of welfare maximization that aligns with whatever moment-to-moment 
distributive outcome is actually produced by the political system—a kind of 
Panglossian social welfare function.164 People who employ less tautological 
measures of distributive optimality would find it highly relevant that 
different distributive results are possible depending on the distributive 
method selected. Such individuals might well be interested in quantifying 
                                                 
164 In Voltaire’s Candide, Dr. Pangloss declared the existing state of affairs to be “the best of all possible 
worlds.”  cite; see also id. (“’It is demonstrable,’ said he, ‘that things cannot be otherwise than as they are;  . . .’”).  
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these distributive differences and considering how they might trade off 
against efficiency considerations. Standard Message closes off these lines 
of inquiry.   
In place of Standard Message, we argue, law and economics scholars 
should be sending one of the following two messages.  
 
Honest Disregard. So you are raising a distributive issue. I think 
that whatever distribution our political equilibrium produces at any 
given time is probably the right one, or at least that we can’t do any 
better at that point in time. If you agree with me that the existing 
distribution is always the most normatively justified one, then I can 
tell you categorically that we should focus only on efficiency in 
crafting legal rules, and just let the political process do whatever it 
does. If you have some other idea about what welfare maximization 
requires in terms of distribution, and you don’t trust the political 
process to get us there, then I can’t really say anything to you about 
that. My work focuses on efficiency, not distribution or politics.  
 
Collaboration. So you are raising a distributive issue. There are 
many different views about what distribution we should pursue as a 
society, which is to say that there are many ways our social welfare 
function could be formulated. But if you tell me that, based on your 
vision of welfarism, you’d like to see more (less) redistribution in 
favor of the poor, there are a couple things I can say about that. 
Right off the bat, there is always an advantage to a tax-and-transfer 
system because it only distorts the labor-leisure decision, and 
doesn’t distort any other decisions. However, the political action 
required to redistribute involves costs, and it’s possible those costs 
may be greater in the tax-and-transfer realm under some 
circumstances. That could potentially tip the balance and cause other 
kinds of distributive changes to dominate.  
 
The first, Honest Disregard, makes clear that the speaker is not 
interested in exploring distributive issues. Consistent with that position, it 
declines to give advice about how to achieve a different distribution. The 
second, Collaboration, seeks to invest intellectual effort in showing how 
someone with a particular distributive objective would go about achieving 
that goal using available legal tools. Part of the analysis would track the 
standard discussions we are critiquing, but, importantly, part of the analysis 
would take into account the role of political action costs. In the spirit of 
Collaboration, then, those concerned about distribution might be told that a 
given legal rule produces change X in distribution but also causes an 
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efficiency loss of Y magnitude, leaving it to those who construct and apply 
social welfare functions to assess if this is a worthwhile trade.165 
 
B.  Doctrinal Redistribution Plausibly Increases Social Welfare 
 
Distributive variance opens up the possibility that a non-tax method of 
redistribution that makes possible a preferred distributive result will 
advance welfare on net, despite introducing other distortions. Conversely, 
an efficient legal rule may produce an enduring distributive deficit that is 
more costly in welfare terms than a less efficient rule that generates better 
distribution. We do not claim that doctrinal redistribution will always, or 
even very frequently, dominate tax-and-transfer—only that it may plausibly 
do so under some circumstances, and that this possibility warrants 
investigation. This section examines some dimensions of that inquiry.   
 
1. Burdens of Proof 
 
A pivotal (if often unstated) premise in most debates about the claim of 
tax superiority concerns who should bear the burden of proof.166 Our view 
is that the individuals who would give categorical and counterintuitive 
advice—that, outside of tax, welfarists should ignore the welfare effects of 
distribution—bear the burden of proving the advice is well-founded. Given 
the falsity of invariance, that burden has not been met, at least not as 
categorical matter.  
At the same time, those who seek to justify particular inefficient 
doctrines on the basis of distribution should, at a minimum, bear the burden 
of showing that the doctrine itself plausibly changes distribution in a way 
that is likely to produce welfare gains.167 This is a minimum condition for 
setting up the possibility that such welfare gains could swamp efficiency 
losses. That further showing—that welfare gains exceed welfare losses—
depends on how heavily different distributive results are weighted within 
the social welfare function under consideration.   
                                                 
165 Weisbach, supra note 52, at 37, states that it would require “serious analysis” to specify the distributional 
weights an agency should give for distributionally-sensitive cost-benefit analysis. But the principle of tax 
superiority stands in the way of collaborating on any such serious analysis. As a starting point, we recommend the 
scholarly identification of the distributional effects of legal changes as being relevant to a full welfare analysis. 
166 K&S have previously asserted that the burden must fall on those who would challenge tax superiority.  
See Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, supra note 21, at 835 (“Although one or another qualification may turn out to 
be relevant in some instances, we would need to have sufficient evidence (or, at minimum, plausible conjectures) 
in order to know what, if any, adjustments to legal rules should be made.”); Markovits, supra note 5, at 523, 610 
(noting and critiquing this assignment of the burden of proof).  
167 As we have seen, the contracting-around argument suggests some purportedly redistributive legal rules 
are no such thing, and this is an excellent reason not to pursue such rules (ones that stand no chance of changing 
distribution in a welfare-enhancing direction). See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.  Neither proponents 
nor opponents of redistributive social policies or legal rules should be relieved of the duty to investigate their 
actual incidence.  
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The net effect on welfare also depends on the extent to which 
distributive changes achieved doctrinally will be countermanded by other 
legal actors or will merely duplicate results that would have otherwise been 
achieved through tax-and-transfer. Our discussion above rebuts the 
strongest version of this claim—complete invariance—but, as the next 
section explains, even partial offsetting and crowding out can remain costly.  
Here, it seems as if those debating the merits of different forms of 
distribution should share the burden of investigating these dynamics.   
 
2. Costly Offsetting and Crowding Out 
 
The existence of distributive variance does not mean that doctrinal 
redistribution is never offset to any degree—only that any such offsetting is 
imperfect. Nor does distributive variance rule out the possibility that 
redistributive legal rules will at times partially or wholly crowd out less 
distortive tax-and-transfer measures. Both offsetting and crowding out can 
be very costly.  These costs may be worth incurring, depending on how the 
final distributive and allocative results compare with those that would have 
obtained in the absence of the initial act of doctrinal redistribution, but they 
should be taken into account. Although we will focus in this section on the 
possibility that Congress will offset the distributive impacts of court-
enacted legal rules, the analysis applies more broadly to all sorts of 
offsetting that might occur as between different governmental actors, such 
as between different courts, courts and administrative agencies, and 
different administrative agencies.   
As an initial matter, it bears emphasis that offsetting may be entirely 
absent in some settings.  It may simply be implausible that certain narrow 
legal rules or local policies will attract distributive countermands from 
anyone. Similarly, when an actor’s opportunities to redistribute are 
sufficiently limited, she may be able to take advantage of all of those 
opportunities without ever producing the sort of aggregate distributive blip 
necessary to attract political attention or galvanize a countermand.  In other 
words, as we discussed above, the Margin of Inaction (MOI) may be larger 
than the full set of plausible redistributive opportunities.  Legal actors such 
as courts may also be confronted with circumstances in which it appears 
unlikely that making a distributive improvement or avoiding a distributive 
deficit will crowd out similar moves by Congress. In these cases, the 
welfarist advice might well be the opposite of that given by K&S:  Instead 
of always ignoring distribution, these actors should always take it into 
account in their decisionmaking.168   
                                                 
168This assumes there are not other institutional or process reasons to keep redistribution out of the hands of 
courts.  See infra Part III.B.3.   
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Significantly, the MOI is a double-edged sword that can also keep 
Congress from making welfare-advancing corrective distributive offsets. 
Thus welfarist courts may decline to adopt distributively harmful efficient 
legal rules when they predict that Congress would be unlikely to provide a 
correction.169 Moreover, the effective MOI encountered by a court could 
grow if background social and economic factors move distribution in, say, 
an even more inegalitarian direction than Congress itself would prefer.170 
Under some social and economic conditions, courts may be in a position to 
both respond to inegalitarian shifts that fly under Congress’s radar and (if 
the court’s preferences are yet more egalitarian than Congress’s) to 
overcorrect for them to an extent that Congress will not counteract.171  
Things become more complicated if the power of courts to effect welfare-
enhancing distributive changes outstrips the MOI; in this case, taking every 
opportunity to move distribution in a welfare-enhancing direction will cause 
some or all such efforts to be counteracted by Congress.172  
Such offsetting can be quite costly. Aside from the resources consumed 
in carrying out move and countermove, the net effect is to leave in place 
distortionary legal rules that no longer produce countervailing distributive 
gains. Offsets may also produce objectionable distributive effects within 
income classes. A doctrinal legal rule that aspires to improve distribution 
will primarily benefit the particular low-income people who happen to be 
involved in particular transactions, activities, or legal disputes, not poor 
people in general.173 But a tax-and-transfer offset that applies broadly across 
income classes will not surgically undo the attempted distributive 
improvement; rather, it will undo it on average for the income class. In this 
scenario, every gain for a low-income individual who benefits from an 
(ostensibly) redistributive legal rule translates into a direct loss for other 
low-income individuals who did not happen to benefit from the 
                                                 
169 It is noteworthy that courts have at times been deemed especially well-suited to assess the political power 
of the litigants and the likelihood that they will be able to achieve their goals politically. [See, e.g., Carolene 
Products FN 4 on discrete and insular minorities]. Thus, courts may have particular institutional competence in 
recognizing when corrective offsetting will and will not occur, and in determining the circumstances under which 
legal rules can improve the position of the politically powerless without drawing legislative countermands. We 
thank Tara Grove for comments on this point.  
170 [cite Piketty] 
171 There is still a potential crowding out concern in these contexts—it is possible that if every welfarist court 
hewed to efficiency as the distributive picture got cumulatively worse that eventually Congress would react to 
improve distribution. But it is also possible that the deteriorating distributive picture would be accompanied by 
shifts in the political equilibrium that would entrench the rising inequality. See Markovits, supra note 5, at __. The 
result could be a sort of “ratchet effect” in which growing inequality begets even more inequality.  [cites].  
172 An interesting question is what happens when the MOI is exceeded. One possibility is that the marginal 
judicial decision that increases redistribution beyond the MOI acts as a tipping point, causing Congress to undo 
the distributive effects of that and all prior judicial decisions. Alternatively, Congress may engage in partial 
offsetting by targeting the largest or most salient targets, while leaving some sub-MOI redistribution intact. It is 
also quite unclear whether and how the individual actions of different courts might aggregate to prompt 
congressional action, especially given the possibility that different decisions may have offsetting or synergistic 
distributive effects.   
173 This is the haphazardness objection. See supra notes __.  
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redistributive legal rules.174   
Yet the fact that costly offsetting can occur hardly proves that the right 
amount of redistribution for welfarist courts to pursue is zero. If additional 
redistribution would enhance welfare, one wants to redistribute as much as 
the MOI allows, but no more. Similarly, welfarist courts would want to stop 
redistributing before their efforts start to crowd out measures that Congress 
would otherwise enact (at lower distortionary cost).175 To the extent that 
Congress reacts to aggregations of distributive changes, courts may face an 
interesting collective action problem. Their success in resolving it depends 
not only on their ability to coordinate, but also on their ability to gauge how 
close they are to inducing Congress to alter the progressivity of the income 
tax. Although the question is an empirical one, the idea that judges are 
capable of such discernment is not implausible. Strategic theories of 
statutory interpretation are premised on the analogous idea that judges 
understand how far an interpretation of a statute can diverge from what the 
current legislature wants.176    
 
3. Alternative Objections: Institutional and Process Concerns 
 
The fact that invariance is false means that multiple distributive 
equilibria are possible within our political system. This result raises 
questions—ones that are elided when invariance is assumed—about 
whether there are reasons to prefer one redistributive institution or process 
over another, independent of the merits of the distributive outcome itself 
and the distortions associated with it. To a large degree, these questions fall 
outside the scope of this paper. Our primary purpose is to highlight and 
criticize the invariance assumption that has played such a large and 
unacknowledged role in the way legal economists treat distributional issues. 
Thus, even if institutional or process considerations weigh against doctrinal 
redistribution, that does not justify using the existing analysis to support tax 
superiority. Nonetheless, we will briefly consider how such considerations 
might affect the welfare analysis.  
                                                 
174  The normative valence of such a distributive result depends on the extent to which income serves as a 
better basis for welfare-improving redistribution than the trigger condition for benefiting from the legal rule.  
There is also a converse scenario that must be considered alongside the one in the text.  Suppose a court chooses 
an efficient rule with bad distributive results for those who happen to be engaged in particular interactions.  If 
Congress then engages in a corrective offset using tax-and-transfer, it will make everyone in the income class 
better off but will leave those who suffered distributive losses in the particular interaction relatively worse off.  In 
other words, this particular drawback of offsetting—that it alters the intra-class distribution—applies whether we 
are talking about offsetting of aspirational changes (which would not be necessary if we followed K&S’s  advice) 
or to corrective offsetting of unwanted effects of distributive rules (which would be continually required if we 
followed K&S’s advice).   
175 The costs of crowding out follow from K&S’s extra distortion argument; one is substituting a more 
distortionary process for a less distortionary one.  Consequently, the degree of harm caused by crowding out 
depends on the validity of the extra distortion argument itself.  See supra notes __ and accompanying text.  
176 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.  
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First, perhaps there is a normative objection to engaging in 
redistribution through institutions other than the legislature. At one point 
K&S come close to claiming that the legislature is institutionally superior, 
compared to courts, for effecting redistribution in a democracy.177 Such a 
claim has real bite when institutional variance exists, because different 
institutional actors are capable of delivering different distributive outcomes. 
A welfarist would presumably approach the question by considering both 
the content of the distributive result available through each alternative 
avenue and the welfare implications of using that particular avenue—
whether administrative costs, costs relating to preferences of the citizenry 
for particular processes, or otherwise. This calls for comparative 
institutional analysis capable of capturing all the differences between the 
distributive routes. We see nothing obvious about the result of this analysis.  
Specifically, we do not see why a theorist would categorically endorse 
courts, for example, to conduct efficiency analysis, but categorically object 
on welfare grounds to their conducting distributive analysis. Efficiency 
analysis is just as complex and contested as distributive analysis, and most 
judges lack formal economic training. Moreover, a court’s single-minded 
pursuit of efficiency in a situated legal context is subject to second-best 
critiques that seem at least as significant as those that might arise from its 
efforts to pursue both efficiency and distribution in that same context.178 
Finally, even if a welfarist were to rule out redistribution by courts based on 
such considerations, other non-tax alternatives would remain open, such as 
redistributive legal rules enacted by legislatures.  
A second objection might be that the doctrinal redistribution is 
inherently (or at least typically) lacking in transparency. Perhaps the reason 
for variance is only that the public will fail to recognize some forms of 
redistribution for what they are and perhaps tax progressivity has the virtue 
of making redistribution plain and visible. Our discussion of salience and 
framing might imply that we favor redistributive methods that trick the 
public into providing support. To be sure, there are difficult normative 
questions that attend any discussion about shaping public perceptions 
surrounding redistribution (or efficiency, for that matter). For one thing, 
failures of transparency can backfire, heightening political action costs or 
producing other direct welfare losses—losses that must be balanced against 
whatever expected distributive gains might thereby be achieved. Again, 
however, we see nothing obvious about how a welfarist analysis would treat 
these issues.  
Significantly, there is no natural “manipulation-free” baseline that 
                                                 
177 Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 19, at 675.  See also Weisbach, supra note 52, at 37 
(suggesting, in contesting distributionally weighted cost-benefit analysis, that “the normal course for democracies 
is for elected legislatures to be allocated the power to make the primary distributive judgments”). 
178 [cites on second best critique]. 
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obviously and uncontroversially reveals the full truth of a distributive 
situation.179 One might say that framing redistribution to highlight features 
like shared contributions to a common goal, reciprocal social insurance, the 
bundling of costs and benefits, or the correction of unfair background 
conditions is a “manipulation.” But the same might be said of a system that 
delivers pre-tax earnings to individuals without making transparent the 
ways in which the earning of that income is itself dependent on public 
expenditures,180 or of a tax code that embeds numerous tax breaks that 
would look offensive to fairness if cast as direct welfare payments.181 If tax 
subsidies for parents of young children are the economic equivalent of tax 
penalties for the childless, yet the former is politically feasible while the 
latter is not, which policy is manipulative and which is transparent?182  
These baseline issues are exacerbated by an underappreciated feature of 
the principle of tax superiority: that it not only directs courts and other 
actors to refrain from adopting doctrines that would improve distribution, it 
also directs them to undertake efficient acts that would worsen 
distribution.183 Yet we would not ordinarily think of a legal rule that merely 
maintained the distributive status quo as “redistributive” in nature.184 In 
what sense is it more transparent to generate distributive neutrality through 
a two-step process in which distribution is first worsened (off-stage) and 
then brought back to baseline through an overtly redistributive process that 
attracts significant political resistance? As recent research suggests, the fact 
that a policy generates political resistance does not mean that it also 
generates an accurate understanding of the incidence of the relevant 
burdens.185 There is no obvious welfare-related reason to categorically 
prefer processes that make preferred distributive patterns maximally 
difficult to achieve and maintain.   
More broadly, welfarists cannot avoid confronting the fact that most 
voters are not committed welfarists. Instead, voters are more likely to 
combine a pragmatic concern for consequences with intuitive concerns for 
non-consequential values like fairness, corrective justice, equality, and 
                                                 
179  [cites to Gamage & Shanske; Nagel & Murphy, supra note 54].  Cf. Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge (on 
inevitability of defaults).   
180 Murphy & Nagel; Gamage. 
181 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.  
182 Cf. note 120 supra and accompanying text (presenting the related Schelling paradox).   
183 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (distinguishing corrective invariance from aspirational 
invariance). 
184 See supra note 54 (on the definition of redistribution).  
185 See Eric J. Brunner et al., Homeowners, Renters, and the Political Economy of Property Taxation (Dec. 4, 
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534044 at 20-21 (finding, using survey data of California homeowner and renter 
attitudes toward sales and property taxes, “that the strong opposition among homeowners to the property tax is not 
associated with the relative tax burden faced by the individual homeowner” and concluding these results are most 
plausibly due to the relatively greater salience of the property tax). Brunner at al. observe that “[w]hile salience is 
clearly associated with greater sensitivity to tax rates, such sensitivity is clearly no guarantee that taxpayers 
rationally consider their personal tax burden or effective tax price of public services when making choices 
concerning public services spending.”  
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political legitimacy. Thus, it is not enough for a welfarist to find a policy 
vehicle for redistribution that satisfies purely welfarist criteria; a committed 
welfarist must also find a political vehicle that aligns or resonates with 
broadly shared forms of normative thinking to which the public subscribes. 
That linkage is what is required to maximize welfare. It is not clear what the 
welfarist objection could be to this approach, especially given that other 
popular beliefs—such as those regarding the connection between effort and 
economic success—already form part of the backdrop against which 
redistributive efforts play out.186   
 
C.   Further Research Into Political Action Costs 
 
Part II surveyed a number of reasons why political action costs might be 
positive and variable, thus falsifying the invariance hypothesis. Each of the 
reasons for doubt about invariance represents an area of existing or potential 
research into the relative magnitude of political action costs, and hence the 
likely feasibility and stickiness of distributive changes. In this section, we 
will briefly consider some directions that future research might take in light 
of the analysis above.  
 
1. Assessing Inputs  
 
Welfarists should be interested in examining the inputs into the 
magnitude of political action costs. These factors will help to determine the 
amount of redistribution that may be uniquely achievable outside of the tax 
system. As in other contexts, our concern should be with identifying 
regularities (here, in mediating political resistance and acceptance) that are 
systematic enough to facilitate predictions about how the costs of political 
action will be affected.  
To focus on just one example, fairness perceptions and preferences 
follow discernible patterns that can be, and have been, uncovered through 
experimental work.187 If understandings of fairness did not exhibit any 
regularities, and instead represented random and highly idiosyncratic 
reactions to different situational features, then it would not be possible to 
say anything predictive about how fairness perceptions would impact 
relative political action costs in different contexts.188 As it is, fairness 
research provides reason to believe that redistribution (including cross-
                                                 
186 See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.  
187 See Part II.C, supra.   
188 An analogous point has been made in the context of behavioral law and economics. See, e.g., Jolls, supra 
note 26, at 1654 (explaining that behavioral law and economics “shares with [law and economics] the view that 
human behavior is organized by predictable patterns, which enable the analyst to generate models (often formal 
ones) and testable hypotheses about the effects of legal rules”).  
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subsidies) embedded in legal rules outside of the tax-and-transfer system—
that is, redistribution that does not advertise itself as such but instead 
operates within rubrics like the granting of entitlements or the correction of 
injustice—will be easier to carry out and harder to countermand. Those 
interested in Collaboration will at least want to investigate this prediction.  
Similarly, cognitive features and biases, as well as determinants of tax 
salience, operate in predictable ways. Other regularities might be uncovered 
surrounding the operation of legislative inertia in response to different 
types, sources, or magnitudes of distributive changes. Welfarists should be 
interested in all of these lines of inquiry. By understanding such 
components of political action costs, it may become possible to formulate 
policies that can achieve more redistribution, or that can achieve the same 
amount of redistribution more cheaply.   
 
2. Assessing Outputs 
 
Attending to political action costs can also change the way existing law, 
policies, and institutions are assessed. The principle of tax superiority is so 
well accepted that it sometimes permeates positive political analysis. For 
example, in a conversation with legal colleagues, the positive question was 
posed: given that peak-load or congestion pricing is efficient, why don’t we 
see more of such pricing of road use in the center of major cities, as we 
observe in London? One of us speculated as follows: because the poor, and 
those concerned with the welfare of the poor, oppose the distributional 
effects of charging the poor to use the roads. Given the K&S claim, the 
retort was obvious: The efficiency gains from congestion pricing of road 
use could be allocated to make the change distributionally neutral or even 
pro-poor, so the distributional effects cannot explain the policy’s failure.189 
Thus, the normative claim of tax superiority seems to support a claim of 
positive political theory: Because the ideal social planner can always 
improve the condition of the poor by (non-tax) legal rules that ignore 
distribution, one cannot explain the existence of inefficient legal rules by a 
political concern for the poor. If one observes inefficient legal rules, then, 
there must be some other explanation apart from concern for distribution—
presumably some political malfunction. Yet this line of analysis erroneously 
assumes invariance. Given varying political action costs, one plausible 
explanation for the existence of inefficient rules, to be explored with other 
plausible public choice theories, is that the inefficiency makes politically 
feasible more welfare-enhancing distribution than would otherwise be 
                                                 
189 For discussion of distributive and political economy issues surrounding congestion pricing, see Jonathan 
Remy Nash, Efficiency versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. 
L. Rev. 673, 725-38 (2008). 
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possible.190  
Our discussion raises other areas for inquiry as well. Recall our previous 
distinction between “corrective invariance” and “aspirational invariance.”  
It is possible that adjustments in one direction or the other are more likely in 
Congress. For example, if redistribution in favor of the poor is understood 
to be more tightly capped by a political ceiling rather than supported by a 
political floor (or vice versa), then changes that make things worse (better) 
for the poor might escape correction to a greater extent than changes that 
make things better (worse) for the poor.191 The question merits empirical 
study. If corrective variance is much more significant than aspirational 
variance, for example, then it might be possible for courts to play a crucial 
role in distributive matters without ever undertaking to “redistribute” from 
the existing baseline. 
These kind of positive questions, the answers to which could alter the 
way we understand the motivations and democratic responsiveness of 
government, provide another object for future research. 
 
3. Pursuing Invariance? 
 
As we suggested above, one way to read K&S’s contribution is as a 
demonstration of the superiority of the tax-and-transfer method for 
accomplishing a given quantum of redistribution conditional on the political 
system actually being willing and able to employ tax-and-transfer to 
achieve that quantum of redistribution.192 The empirical falsity of 
invariance does not undermine that claim, which raises the interesting 
question of how we might shift more actual redistribution to the tax-and-
transfer system.193 Put a little differently, if we could do more to make 
invariance true, should we?   
The answer for a welfarist would turn, of course, on whether welfare 
would thereby be advanced. But the problem is complicated by 
heterogeneity in redistributive preferences among various actors, who may 
subscribe to different social welfare functions that weight distribution very 
differently. Consider two different ways that invariance could be advanced 
as a positive matter. First, agencies, courts, and legislative bodies at all 
levels of government could be required to estimate the distributive impacts 
of their every act and report this to Congress, to facilitate distributive 
                                                 
190 Compare Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiaci, The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of Sticks, 80 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 341, 354 (2013) (suggesting that economists miss the positive political explanations of the 
differential use of carrots and sticks, which depend on their distributional effects, because of the normative belief 
that taxes alone should determine distribution). 
191 [cites – influence of wealthy in political process], 
192 See text accompanying note 159, supra.  
193 This point is tightly connected to the notion of a “political Coase Theorem.”  See Acemoglu, supra note 
158.  
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offsetting through the tax system,194 and Congress could adopt the practice 
of offsetting the net effect of these changes annually.195 Second, agencies, 
courts, and legislative bodies at all levels of government could condition 
their own forbearance in using their redistributive powers on Congress 
undertaking certain redistributive acts.196   
Both approaches would be aimed at ensuring that whatever 
redistribution does occur (from a baseline of efficiency), occurs through tax 
and transfer. This would carry some welfare gains in reducing the 
behavioral distortions from redistributive legal rules, assuming for present 
purposes that K&S are correct in their extra distortion argument. But in the 
first case the distributive preferences of Congress would trump, while in the 
second the distributive preferences of the other bodies would trump. 
Variance is removed by allowing one distributive result to dominate; 
whether this advances or reduces welfare depends on one’s social welfare 
function.    
This thought experiment—making invariance true—brings us full circle. 
A redistributive mechanism’s relative merits as a redistributive mechanism 
cannot be evaluated independent of the distribution that it will be used to 
carry out. Efforts to channel all redistribution into the least distortionary 
mechanism (whether by institutional reform or academic argument) cannot 
be supported solely by reference to it being the least distortionary 
mechanism. The invariance hypothesis tells us we can do no better in 
distributive terms elsewhere because, in effect, there is no elsewhere. Once 
we recognize that political action costs drive a wedge between  the 
distributive results that other actors and bodies can achieve and the 
distributive preferences Congress instantiates through its tax and transfer 
policy, though, we cannot avoid the difficult normative questions about 
which distributive preferences—and whose—should take precedence.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
If transaction costs were zero, we could select legal rules based solely 
on their welfare-advancing distributive properties and still reach an efficient 
                                                 
194There are some existing examples of such reporting requirements. See e.g, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-
primer.pdf (describing regulatory impact analysis standards which include “distributional effects”). 
195 An alternative would be for Congress to key its tax responses to changes in an objective benchmark, such 
as the Gini coefficient. See Robert J. Shiller, The New Financial Order 149-64 (2003) (discussing the possibility 
of conditioning tax rates on achievement of certain measures of after-tax income equality, to provide a form of 
societal “inequality insurance”). 
196 Cf. supra note __ and accompanying text (discussing “trade adjustment assistance” programs that 
compensate those who lose out from free trade agreements); Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 
(9th Cir. 2006) vacated as moot, No. 04-55324, 2007 WL 3010591, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007) (enjoining 
enforcement of ordinance against sitting, lying, or sleeping in public streets or sidewalks unless enough shelter 
beds are provided). 
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outcome in every instance. Transaction costs, then, drive the insistence on 
efficient rules that underpins the principle of tax superiority. But tax 
superiority also depends on an assumption about another impediment to 
welfare maximization: that the political action costs necessary to achieve a 
desired distributive effect will never be larger for taxes than they are for 
doctrinal rules. This assumption, in turn, underpins the invariance 
hypothesis that we have criticized here. In fact, the costs of redistribution 
can vary across redistributive contexts in ways that make some distributive 
patterns impossible to achieve and maintain through tax alone. This 
distributive variance carries profound implications for the pursuit of social 
welfare, ones that welfarists should be interested in tracing.  
Clearing away the assumption of distributive invariance upon which the 
principle of tax superiority is founded opens up new avenues of research for 
law and economics scholars. In addition to providing a reason why 
distributive goals might at times be better pursued through legal rules than 
through tax mechanisms, our analysis invites inquiry into the factors that 
influence the magnitude and operation of political action costs. 
Incorporating these elements into the analysis is admittedly messy; it 
upends the tidy division of labor that the invariance hypothesis supports.197  
But as Nobel Laureate James Heckman has recognized, law and economics 
is “analytically incomplete” without “a satisfactory framework within 
which to analyze redistribution.”198 In his words, “A fully satisfactory 
analysis would require a careful accounting of the politics of redistribution 
and the gap between ideal policies and those that are actually used by 
governments as they emerge from political compromises.”199  We agree.  
 
 
                                                 
197 Cf. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law at 15 (“The world of zero transaction costs, to which the 
Coase Theorem applies, is the world of modern economic analysis, and economists therefore feel quite 
comfortable handling the intellectual problems it poses, remote from the real world though they may be.”), 
198 Heckman, supra note 55, at 332. 
199 Id. 
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